Related papers: Acyclic Games and Iterative Voting

We investigate the dynamics of Q-learning in a class of generalized Braess paradox games. These games represent an important class of network routing games where the associated stage-game Nash equilibria do not constitute social optima. We…

Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many…

It is known that individuals in social networks tend to exhibit homophily (a.k.a. assortative mixing) in their social ties, which implies that they prefer bonding with others of their own kind. But what are the reasons for this phenomenon?…

Given a bimatrix game, the associated leadership or commitment games are defined as the games at which one player, the leader, commits to a (possibly mixed) strategy and the other player, the follower, chooses his strategy after having…

We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, in which the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy, augmented by a fixed non-negative integer bonus for picking a…

Games are natural models for multi-agent machine learning settings, such as generative adversarial networks (GANs). The desirable outcomes from algorithmic interactions in these games are encoded as game theoretic equilibrium concepts, e.g.…

We consider solutions of normal form games that are invariant under strategic equivalence. We consider additional properties that can be expected (or be desired) from a solution of a game, and we observe the following: - Even the weakest…

We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…

In game-theoretic learning, several agents are simultaneously following their individual interests, so the environment is non-stationary from each player's perspective. In this context, the performance of a learning algorithm is often…

In general, Nash equilibria in normal-form games may require players to play (probabilistically) mixed strategies. We define a measure of the complexity of finite probability distributions and study the complexity required to play Nash…

In nature and society problems arise when different interests are difficult to reconcile, which are modeled in game theory. While most applications assume uncorrelated games, a more detailed modeling is necessary to consider the…

In this paper, we introduce an agent-based representation of games, in order to propose a compact representation for multi-party games in game theory. Our method is inspired by concepts in process theory and process algebra. In addition, we…

We here study the Battle of the Sexes game, a textbook case of asymmetric games, on small networks. Due to the conflicting preferences of the players, analytical approaches are scarce and most often update strategies are employed in…

We introduce a general representation of large-population games in which each player s influence ON the others IS centralized AND limited, but may otherwise be arbitrary.This representation significantly generalizes the class known AS…

This paper addresses the distributed Nash Equilibrium seeking problem for aggregative games, where legitimate players' decisions are affected by potential malicious players. To describe players' behavior, we introduce a novel heterogeneous…

We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. As first contribution, we investigate the relations between the concepts of Nash…

By the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem, every reasonable voting rule for three or more alternatives is susceptible to manipulation: there exist elections where one or more voters can change the election outcome in their favour by…

Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We…

This paper studies a class of dynamic Stackelberg games under open-loop information structure with constrained linear agent dynamics and quadratic utility functions. We show two important properties for this class of dynamic Stackelberg…

Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are known to be intractable, unless the information flow is severely restricted. Examples of undecidable cases typically feature a situation where players…