Related papers: A Note on Bayesian Rationality and Correlated Equi…
In rational verification, the aim is to verify which temporal logic properties will obtain in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents ("players") in the system choose strategies for acting that form a game theoretic…
When inferring the goals that others are trying to achieve, people intuitively understand that others might make mistakes along the way. This is crucial for activities such as teaching, offering assistance, and deciding between blame or…
Many real-world systems are composed of interdependent networks that rely on one another. Such networks are typically designed and operated by different entities, who aim at maximizing their own payoffs. There exists a game among these…
We consider a dynamic game with asymmetric information where each player observes privately a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world V, resulting in dependent private observations. We study structured perfect Bayesian equilibria…
We study the group strategic behaviors in Bayesian games. Equilibria in previous work do not consider group strategic behaviors with bounded sizes and are too ``strong'' to exist in many scenarios. We propose the ex-ante Bayesian $k$-strong…
This paper introduces a new solution concept for non-cooperative games in normal form with no ties and pure strategies: the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium. The players are rational in all possible worlds and know each other's strategies…
This paper analyzes a dynamic interaction between a fully rational, privately informed sender and a boundedly rational, uninformed receiver with memory constraints. The sender controls the flow of information, while the receiver designs a…
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…
We develop a model to study the role of rationality in economics and biology. The model's agents differ continuously in their ability to make rational choices. The agents' objective is to ensure their individual survival over time or,…
Quantum games with incomplete information can be studied within a Bayesian framework. We consider a version of prisoner's dilemma (PD) in this framework with three players and characterize the Nash equilibria. A variation of the standard PD…
We investigate the equilibrium stability and robustness in a class of moving target defense problems, in which players have both incomplete information and asymmetric cognition. We first establish a Bayesian Stackelberg game model for…
We examine sequential equilibrium in the context of computational games, where agents are charged for computation. In such games, an agent can rationally choose to forget, so issues of imperfect recall arise. In this setting, we consider…
We apply a Bayesian agent-based framework inspired by QBism to iterations of two quantum games, the CHSH game and the quantum prisoners' dilemma. In each two-player game, players hold beliefs about an amount of shared entanglement and about…
A Bayesian game is a game of incomplete information in which the rules of the game are not fully known to all players. We consider the Bayesian game of Battle of Sexes that has several Bayesian Nash equilibria and investigate its outcome…
Boolean games are a succinct representation of strategic games wherein a player seeks to satisfy a formula of propositional logic by selecting a truth assignment to a set of propositional variables under his control. The framework has…
We show that standard Bayesian games cannot represent the full spectrum of belief-dependent preferences. However, by introducing a fundamental distinction between intended and actual strategies, we remove this limitation. We define Bayesian…
Many studies have shown that humans are "predictably irrational": they do not act in a fully rational way, but their deviations from rational behavior are quite systematic. Our goal is to see the extent to which we can explain and justify…
The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk…
Poker is ideal for testing automated reasoning under uncertainty. It introduces uncertainty both by physical randomization and by incomplete information about opponents hands.Another source OF uncertainty IS the limited information…
This study investigates differential games with motion-payoff uncertainty in continuous-time settings. We propose a framework where players update their beliefs about uncertain parameters using continuous Bayesian updating. Theoretical…