Related papers: A Note on Bayesian Rationality and Correlated Equi…
We study a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information where agents' beliefs are strategy dependent, i.e. signaling occurs. We show that the notion of sufficient information, introduced in the companion paper team, can be…
Coordination is a desirable feature in many multi-agent systems such as robotic and socioeconomic networks. We consider a task allocation problem as a binary networked coordination game over an undirected regular graph. Each agent in the…
Conventional game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational. In a realistic situation, however, players are rarely perfectly rational. This bounded rationality is one of the main reasons why the predictions of Nash equilibrium in…
In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation,…
We investigate the consequences of allowing players to adopt strategies which take advantage of quantum randomization devices. In games of full information, the resulting equilibria are always correlated equilibria, but not all correlated…
We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoffs, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is of low quality, equilibrium uniqueness obtains in a manner…
Game theoretic equilibria are mathematical expressions of rationality. Rational agents are used to model not only humans and their software representatives, but also organisms, populations, species and genes, interacting with each other and…
We provide a syntactic construction of correlated equilibrium. For any finite game, we study how players coordinate their play on a signal by means of a public strategy whose instructions are expressed in some natural language. Language can…
Is it rational for selfish individuals to cooperate? The conventional answer based on analysis of games such as the Prisoners Dilemma (PD) is that it is not, even though mutual cooperation results in a better outcome for all. This…
In this note, we prove the existence of an equilibrium concept, dubbed conditional strategy equilibrium, for non-cooperative games in which a strategy of a player is a function from the other players' actions to her own actions. We study…
The dominant theories of rational choice assume logical omniscience. That is, they assume that when facing a decision problem, an agent can perform all relevant computations and determine the truth value of all relevant logical/mathematical…
Recent price-of-anarchy analyses of games of complete information suggest that coarse correlated equilibria, which characterize outcomes resulting from no-regret learning dynamics, have near-optimal welfare. This work provides two main…
Differences in perception, information asymmetries, and bounded rationality lead game-theoretic players to derive a private, subjective view of the game that may diverge from the underlying ground-truth scenario and may be misaligned with…
This paper studies the rationalization and identification of binary games where players have correlated private types. Allowing for correlation is crucial in global games and in models with social interactions as it represents correlated…
We consider finite-horizon and infinite-horizon versions of a dynamic game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions that are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as conditionally independent Markov…
In nature and society problems arise when different interests are difficult to reconcile, which are modeled in game theory. While most applications assume uncorrelated games, a more detailed modeling is necessary to consider the…
Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are…
This paper studies Bayesian games with general action spaces, correlated types and interdependent payoffs. We introduce the condition of ``decomposable coarser payoff-relevant information'', and show that this condition is both sufficient…
Quantum game theory lays a foundation for understanding the interaction of people using quantum computers with conflicting interests. Recently Zhang proposed a simple yet rich model to study quantum strategic games, and addressed some…
We present a subjective equilibrium notion (called "subjective equilibrium under beliefs of exogenous uncertainty (SEBEU)" for stochastic dynamic games in which each player chooses her decisions under the (incorrect) belief that a…