Related papers: Abstract Interpretation of Supermodular Games
Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. There are different ways of weakening a definition of Nash-like equilibrium in order to guarantee the existence of a weakened equilibrium.…
Noncooperative games with uncertain payoffs have been classically studied under the expected-utility theory framework, which relies on the strong assumption that agents behave rationally. However, simple experiments on human decision makers…
This paper provides theoretical bounds for empirical game theoretical analysis of complex multi-agent interactions. We provide insights in the empirical meta game showing that a Nash equilibrium of the meta-game is an approximate Nash…
Imperfect-recall abstraction has emerged as the leading paradigm for practical large-scale equilibrium computation in incomplete-information games. However, imperfect-recall abstractions are poorly understood, and only weak…
The Nash Equilibrium is a much discussed, deceptively complex, method for the analysis of non-cooperative games. If one reads many of the commonly available definitions the description of the Nash Equilibrium is deceptively simple in…
We study pure Nash equilibria in infinite-duration games on graphs, with partial visibility of actions but communication (based on a graph) among the players. We show that a simple communication mechanism consisting in reporting the…
Dynamic games are powerful tools to model multi-agent decision-making, yet computing Nash (generalized Nash) equilibria remains a central challenge in such settings. Complexity arises from tightly coupled optimality conditions, nested…
In this work, we provide a structural characterization of the possible Nash equilibria in the well-studied class of security games with additive utility. Our analysis yields a classification of possible equilibria into seven types and we…
We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding…
We consider solutions of normal form games that are invariant under strategic equivalence. We consider additional properties that can be expected (or be desired) from a solution of a game, and we observe the following: - Even the weakest…
We provide general theoretical foundations for modeling strategic uncertainty in large distributional Bayesian games with general type spaces, using a version of interim correlated rationalizability. We then focus on the case in which…
In this paper, we present a method for finding approximate Nash equilibria in a broad class of reachability games. These games are often used to formulate both collision avoidance and goal satisfaction. Our method is computationally…
We introduce the LLM-Nash framework, a game-theoretic model where agents select reasoning prompts to guide decision-making via Large Language Models (LLMs). Unlike classical games that assume utility-maximizing agents with full rationality,…
In this paper, an aggregate game approach is proposed for the modeling and analysis of energy consumption control in smart grid. Since the electricity user's cost function depends on the aggregate load, which is unknown to the end users, an…
We prove that, under appropriate conditions, an abstract game with quasi-Leontief payoff functions $u_i : \prod_{j=1}^nX_j\to\mathbb{R}$ has a Nash equilibria. When all the payoff functions are globally quasi-Leontief, the existence and the…
In applied game theory the motivation of players is a key element. It is encoded in the payoffs of the game form and often based on utility functions. But there are cases were formal descriptions in the form of a utility function do not…
We present a computational formulation for the approximate version of several variational inequality problems, investigating their computational complexity and establishing PPAD-completeness. Examining applications in computational game…
We show how solution concepts in games such as Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, and sequential equilibrium can be given a uniform definition in terms of \emph{knowledge-based programs}. Intuitively, all solution…
This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with merely monotone and restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method…
We compute a parametric description of the totally mixed Nash equilibria of a generic game in normal form with pre-fixed structure. Using this representation, we show conditions under which a game has the maximum possible number of this…