Related papers: Abstract Interpretation of Supermodular Games
We introduce and study the class of semidefinite games, which generalizes bimatrix games and finite $N$-person games, by replacing the simplex of the mixed strategies for each player by a slice of the positive semidefinite cone in the space…
A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system…
In the context of large population symmetric games, approximate Nash equilibria are introduced through equilibrium solutions of the corresponding mean field game in the sense that the individual gain from optimal unilateral deviation under…
In recent work, semantic games of independence-friendly logic were studied in strategic form in terms of (mixed strategy) Nash equilibria. The class of strategic games of independence-friendly logic is contained in the class of win-loss,…
We prove three results on the existence and structure of Nash equilibria for quasisupermodular games. A theorem is purely order-theoretic, and the other two involve topological hypotheses. Our topological results genralize Zhou's theorem…
Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games -- in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite -- is far more…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
Motivated by the fact that in many game-theoretic settings, the game analyzed is only an approximation to the game being played, in this work we analyze equilibrium computation for the broad and natural class of bimatrix games that are…
We investigate the sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium of constrained network aggregative games to changes in exogenous parameters affecting the cost function of the players. This setting is motivated by two applications. The first is the…
Structured game representations have recently attracted interest as models for multi-agent artificial intelligence scenarios, with rational behavior most commonly characterized by Nash equilibria. This paper presents efficient, exact…
We analyze the robustness of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria for network games against perturbations of the players' utility functions. We first derive a simple characterization of the margin of robustness, defined as the minimum magnitude…
We introduce a new unified framework for modelling both decision problems and finite games based on quantifiers and selection functions. We show that the canonical utility maximisation is one special case of a quantifier and that our more…
The computational characterization of game-theoretic solution concepts is a central topic in artificial intelligence, with the aim of developing computationally efficient tools for finding optimal ways to behave in strategic interactions.…
Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games…
The recent mean field game (MFG) formalism facilitates otherwise intractable computation of approximate Nash equilibria in many-agent settings. In this paper, we consider discrete-time finite MFGs subject to finite-horizon objectives. We…
In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil's Extended Argumentation Frameworks.…
We consider evolutionary dynamics for population games in which players have a continuum of strategies at their disposal. Models in this setting amount to infinite-dimensional differential equations evolving on the manifold of probability…
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…
The recently defined class of integer programming games (IPG) models situations where multiple self-interested decision makers interact, with their strategy sets represented by a finite set of linear constraints together with integer…
We consider a class of N-player stochastic games of multi-dimensional singular control, in which each player faces a minimization problem of monotone-follower type with submodular costs. We call these games "monotone-follower games". In a…