Related papers: Extortion under Uncertainty: Zero-Determinant Stra…

In open-world environments, artificial agents must often contend with novel conditions that deviate from their training or design assumptions. This paper studies the robustness of fixed-strategy agents to such novelty within the setting of…

Moving Target Defense (MTD) is commonly formulated as a repeated security game to mitigate persistent threats. Although the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) characterizes the defender's optimal strategy in the leader-follower framework,…

We introduce the concept of deformed zero-determinant strategies in repeated games. We then show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game is a deformed zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the…

Direct reciprocity and conditional cooperation are important mechanisms to prevent free riding in social dilemmas. But in large groups these mechanisms may become ineffective, because they require single individuals to have a substantial…

We investigate the impact of payoff shocks on the evolution of large populations of myopic players that employ simple strategy revision protocols such as the "imitation of success". In the noiseless case, this process is governed by the…

In this paper, $2\times2$ zero-sum games are studied under the following assumptions: $(1)$ One of the players (the leader) commits to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy); $(2)$ The leader announces its…

In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…

Self-serving, rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit. The two-player iterated prisoner's dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation. It is generally believed that there is no simple ultimatum…

Promoting cooperation is an intellectual challenge in the social sciences, for which the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma (IPD) is a fundamental framework. The traditional view that there exists no simple ultimatum strategy whereby one player…

I study a repeated game in which a patient player (e.g., a seller) wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g., buyers) but can strictly benefit from betraying them. Her benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is her…

We study a nonzero-sum game of two players which is a generalization of the antagonistic noisy duel of discrete type. The game is considered from the point of view of various criterions of optimality. We prove existence of…

We consider misinformation games, i.e., multi-agent interactions where the players are misinformed with regards to the game that they play, essentially having an \emph{incorrect} understanding of the game setting, without being aware of…

We define a new strategy for population games based on techniques from machine learning and statistical inference that is essentially uninvadable and can successfully invade (significantly more likely than a neutral mutant) essentially all…

An active line of research has considered games played on networks in which payoffs depend on both a player's individual decision and also the decisions of her neighbors. Such games have been used to model issues including the formation of…

We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…

This paper presents a payoff perturbation technique, introducing a strong convexity to players' payoff functions in games. This technique is specifically designed for first-order methods to achieve last-iterate convergence in games where…

In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner of the game. Such games are central in formal methods since they model the interaction between a…

Tit-for-Tat strategy is a strategy in repeated two-player symmetric games which imitates the previous action of the opponent. We show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy is a zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the expected…

This paper studies an instance of zero-sum games in which one player (the leader) commits to its opponent (the follower) to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy). The actions of the leader are observed by the…

We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…