Related papers: Extortion under Uncertainty: Zero-Determinant Stra…

We consider two-player games played in real time on game structures with clocks where the objectives of players are described using parity conditions. The games are \emph{concurrent} in that at each turn, both players independently propose…

In a single-state repeated game, zero-determinant strategies can unilaterally force functions of the payoffs to take values in particular closed intervals. When the explicit use of a determinant is absent from the analysis, they are instead…

People make strategic decisions many times a day - during negotiations, when coordinating actions with others, or when choosing partners for cooperation. The resulting dynamics can be studied with learning theory and evolutionary game…

We introduce the study of search games between a mobile Searcher and an immobile Hider in a new setting in which the Searcher has some potentially erroneous information, i.e., a prediction on the Hider's position. The objective is to…

The Prisoner's Dilemma game has a long history stretching across the social, biological, and physical sciences. In 2012, Press and Dyson developed a method for analyzing the mapping of the 8-dimensional strategy profile onto the…

Despite incredible advances, deep learning has been shown to be susceptible to adversarial attacks. Numerous approaches have been proposed to train robust networks both empirically and certifiably. However, most of them defend against only…

We study zero-sum differential games with state constraints and one-sided information, where the informed player (Player 1) has a categorical payoff type unknown to the uninformed player (Player 2). The goal of Player 1 is to minimize his…

We study stochastic effects on the lagging anchor dynamics, a reinforcement learning algorithm used to learn successful strategies in iterated games, which is known to converge to Nash points in the absence of noise. The dynamics is…

Reinforcement-based learning dynamics may exhibit several limitations when applied in a distributed setup. In (repeatedly-played) multi-player/action strategic-form games, and when each player applies an independent copy of the learning…

Repeated game has long been the touchstone model for agents' long-run relationships. Previous results suggest that it is particularly difficult for a repeated game player to exert an autocratic control on the payoffs since they are jointly…

We discuss a duel-type game in which Player I uses his resource continuously and Player II distributes it by discrete portions. Each player knows how much resources he and his opponent have at every moment of time. The solution of the game…

Reputation is a powerful mechanism to enforce cooperation among unrelated individuals through indirect reciprocity, but it suffers from disagreement originating from private assessment, noise, and incomplete information. In this work, we…

We consider two-player games played in real time on game structures with clocks and parity objectives. The games are concurrent in that at each turn, both players independently propose a time delay and an action, and the action with the…

We examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in a continuous game with other optimizing agents: in this case, if all players follow a no-regret algorithm, it is possible to achieve significantly lower regret…

In communication systems where users share common resources, users' selfish behavior usually results in suboptimal resource utilization. There have been extensive works that model communication systems with selfish users as one-shot games…

Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…

This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to address the problem of optimal sensor placement against an adversary in uncertain networked control systems. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game with two players, namely a malicious…

Within the context of video games the notion of perfectly rational agents can be undesirable as it leads to uninteresting situations, where humans face tough adversarial decision makers. Current frameworks for stochastic games and…

In this paper, we consider zero-sum repeated games in which the maximizer is restricted to strategies requiring no more than a limited amount of randomness. Particularly, we analyze the maxmin payoff of the maximizer in two models: the…

We introduce a "high probability" framework for repeated games with incomplete information. In our non-equilibrium setting, players aim to guarantee a certain payoff with high probability, rather than in expected value. We provide a high…