Tit-for-Tat Strategy as a Deformed Zero-Determinant Strategy in Repeated Games
Combinatorics
2021-01-28 v2 Physics and Society
Abstract
We introduce the concept of deformed zero-determinant strategies in repeated games. We then show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game is a deformed zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the probability distribution functions of payoffs of two players.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2012.07659,
title = {Tit-for-Tat Strategy as a Deformed Zero-Determinant Strategy in Repeated Games},
author = {Masahiko Ueda},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2012.07659},
year = {2021}
}
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2 pages