Related papers: Equilibria in multi-player multi-outcome infinite …
We consider extensive games with perfect information with well-founded game trees and study the problems of existence and of characterization of the sets of subgame perfect equilibria in these games. We also provide such characterizations…
We consider multi-player stopping games in continuous time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after all the players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy by observing other…
This paper extends Berge's maximum theorem for possibly noncompact action sets and unbounded cost functions to minimax problems and studies applications of these extensions to two-player zero-sum games with possibly noncompact action sets…
We study the structure of the set of equilibrium payoffs in finite games, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. A nonempty subset of R^2 is shown to be the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of a bimatrix game if and only if it…
We study multiplayer reachability games played on a finite directed graph equipped with target sets, one for each player. In those reachability games, it is known that there always exists a Nash equilibrium (NE) and a subgame perfect…
We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in stochastic multiplayer games with $\omega$-regular objectives. While the existence of an equilibrium whose payoff falls into a certain interval may be undecidable, we…
In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the…
We study a two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential game where one player controls the state variable via additive impulses while the other player can stop the game at any time. The main goal of this work is characterize Nash…
Synthesis of finite-state controllers from high-level specifications in multi-agent systems can be reduced to solving multi-player concurrent games over finite graphs. The complexity of solving such games with qualitative objectives for…
In this short note we study a class of multi-player, turn-based games with deterministic state transitions and reachability / safety objectives (this class contains as special cases "classic" two-player reachability and safety games as well…
We investigate the degree of discontinuity of several solution concepts from non-cooperative game theory. While the consideration of Nash equilibria forms the core of our work, also pure and correlated equilibria are dealt with. Formally,…
In this paper we investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games whose cost functionals are defined by a system of coupled backward stochastic differential equations. We obtain an existence…
We prove that every two-player non-zero-sum Borel game with lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect $\ep$-equilibrium. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003), which shows that a subgame-perfect…
We consider finite $n$-person deterministic graphical games and study the existence of pure stationary Nash-equilibrium in such games. We assume that all infinite plays are equivalent and form a unique outcome, while each terminal position…
We show that every two-player stochastic game with finite state and action sets and bounded, Borel-measurable, and shift-invariant payoffs, admits an $\ep$-equilibrium for all $\varepsilon>0$.
The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…
The central result of classical game theory states that every finite normal form game has a Nash equilibrium, provided that players are allowed to use randomized (mixed) strategies. However, in practice, humans are known to be bad at…
We investigate whether having a unique equilibrium (or a given number of equilibria) is robust to perturbation of the payoffs, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. We show that the set of n-player finite games with a unique…
We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…
We show that equilibria of a sequential semi-anonymous nonatomic game (SSNG) can be adopted by players in corresponding large but finite dynamic games to achieve near-equilibrium payoffs. Such equilibria in the form of random…