English

On Nash Equilibria in Play-Once and Terminal Deterministic Graphical Games

Theoretical Economics 2025-03-25 v1 Computer Science and Game Theory

Abstract

We consider finite nn-person deterministic graphical games and study the existence of pure stationary Nash-equilibrium in such games. We assume that all infinite plays are equivalent and form a unique outcome, while each terminal position is a separate outcome. It is known that for n=2n=2 such a game always has a Nash equilibrium, while that may not be true for n>2n > 2. A game is called {\em play-once} if each player controls a unique position and {\em terminal} if any terminal outcome is better than the infinite one for each player. We prove in this paper that play-once games have Nash equilibria. We also show that terminal games have Nash equilibria if they have at most three terminals.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2503.17387,
  title  = {On Nash Equilibria in Play-Once and Terminal Deterministic Graphical Games},
  author = {Endre Boros and Vladimir Gurvich and Kazuhisa Makino},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.17387},
  year   = {2025}
}
R2 v1 2026-06-28T22:30:11.793Z