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Borel Games with Lower-Semi-Continuous Payoffs

Probability 2009-11-18 v1 Logic

Abstract

We prove that every two-player non-zero-sum Borel game with lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect \ep\ep-equilibrium. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003), which shows that a subgame-perfect \ep\ep-equilibrium need not exists when the payoffs are not lower-semi-continuous.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.0911.3246,
  title  = {Borel Games with Lower-Semi-Continuous Payoffs},
  author = {Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi and Eilon Solan},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:0911.3246},
  year   = {2009}
}
R2 v1 2026-06-21T14:12:36.832Z