Related papers: Two-player preplay negotiation games with conditio…

We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase of negotiations before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, in order…

We consider transformations of normal form games by binding preplay offers of players for payments of utility to other players conditional on them playing designated in the offers strategies. The game-theoretic effect of such preplay offers…

We study voting games on binary issues, where voters hold an objective over the outcome of the collective decision and are allowed, before the vote takes place, to negotiate their voting strategy with the other participants. We analyse the…

Game theory provides a mathematical framework for analysing strategic situations involving at least two players. Normal-form games model situations where the players simultaneously pick their moves. In this thesis we explore the strategic…

In strategic games such as the prisoner's dilemma, allowing players to make binding offers of utility transfers before play has been shown to alter incentives and potentially support cooperative outcomes. These preplay exchange mechanisms…

We consider preference communication in two-player multi-objective normal-form games. In such games, the payoffs resulting from joint actions are vector-valued. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume there exists a utility function for…

A classic model to study strategic decision making in multi-agent systems is the normal-form game. This model can be generalised to allow for an infinite number of pure strategies leading to continuous games. Multi-objective normal-form…

We consider the interim core of normal form cooperative games and exchange economies with incomplete information based on the partition model. We develop a solution concept that we can situate roughly between Wilson's coarse core and…

Negotiation is a very common interaction between automated agents. Many common negotiation protocols work with cardinal utilities, even though ordinal preferences, which only rank the outcomes, are easier to elicit from humans. In this work…

In adversarial interactions, one is often required to make strategic decisions over multiple periods of time, wherein decisions made earlier impact a player's competitive standing as well as how choices are made in later stages. In this…

It is known that a player in a noncooperative game can benefit by publicly restricting his possible moves before play begins. We show that, more generally, a player may benefit by publicly committing to pay an external party an amount that…

Online games are dynamic environments where players interact with each other, which offers a rich setting for understanding how players negotiate their way through the game to an ultimate victory. This work studies online player…

We consider two-player random extensive form games where the payoffs at the leaves are independently drawn uniformly at random from a given feasible set C. We study the asymptotic distribution of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for…

As Aumann stated, cooperation and non-cooperation are different ways of viewing the same game, with the main difference being whether players can reach a binding cooperative agreement. In the real world, many games often coexist competition…

We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…

We introduce a two-player game, in which each player extends a given sequence by picking a free element in a domain D of the real line. The aim of the players is to control the parity of the number of transpositions necessary to put the…

In this paper we introduce novel algorithmic strategies for effciently playing two-player games in which the players have different or identical player roles. In the case of identical roles, the players compete for the same objective (that…

A valuation for a player in a game in extensive form is an assignment of numeric values to the players moves. The valuation reflects the desirability moves. We assume a myopic player, who chooses a move with the highest valuation.…

This paper introduces a novel framework for modeling interacting humans in a multi-stage game. This "iterated semi network-form game" framework has the following desirable characteristics: (1) Bounded rational players, (2) strategic players…

We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…