Related papers: The Complexity of Infinitely Repeated Alternating …

This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with perfect or almost perfect information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general…

We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding…

This paper deals with the complexity of the problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium for discrete preference games and network coordination games beyond $O(\log n)$-treewidth and tree metric spaces. First, we estimate the number of…

This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions for two-person zero-sum games with inf/sup-compact payoff functions and with possibly noncompact decision sets for both players. Payoff functions may be unbounded, and…

We study the problem of computing optimal correlated equilibria (CEs) in infinite-horizon multi-player stochastic games, where correlation signals are provided over time. In this setting, optimal CEs require history-dependent policies; this…

We prove that, assuming the exponential time hypothesis, finding an \epsilon-approximately optimal symmetric signaling scheme in a two-player zero-sum game requires quasi-polynomial time. This is tight by [Cheng et al., FOCS'15] and…

This paper identifies a manifold in the space of bimatrix games which contains games that are strategically equivalent to rank-1 games through a positive affine transformation. It also presents an algorithm that can compute, in polynomial…

The classical, complete-information two-player games assume that the problem data (in particular the payoff matrix) is known exactly by both players. In a now famous result, Nash has shown that any such game has an equilibrium in mixed…

Several works have shown unconditional hardness (via integrality gaps) of computing equilibria using strong hierarchies of convex relaxations. Such results however only apply to the problem of computing equilibria that optimize a certain…

We present a framework for computing approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of continuous-action games. It is a modification of the traditional double oracle algorithm, extended to multiple players and continuous action spaces. Unlike…

Repeated quantum game theory addresses long term relations among players who choose quantum strategies. In the conventional quantum game theory, single round quantum games or at most finitely repeated games have been widely studied, however…

Priced timed games (PTGs) are two-player zero-sum games played on the infinite graph of configurations of priced timed automata where two players take turns to choose transitions in order to optimize cost to reach target states. Bouyer et…

Many interactions result in a socially suboptimal equilibrium, or in a non-equilibrium state, from which arriving at an equilibrium through simple dynamics can be impossible of too long. Aiming to achieve a certain equilibrium, we persuade,…

Despite significant research efforts, the state-of-the-art algorithm for maintaining an approximate matching in fully dynamic graphs has a polynomial {worst-case} update time, even for very poor approximation guarantees. In a recent…

In this paper, we resolve the computational complexity of a number of outstanding open problems with practical applications. Here is the list of problems we show to be PPAD-complete, along with the domains of practical significance:…

This paper studies a large class of two-player perfect-information turn-based parity games on infinite graphs, namely those generated by collapsible pushdown automata. The main motivation for studying these games comes from the connections…

We study optimal equilibria in multi-player games. An equilibrium is optimal for a player, if her payoff is maximal. A tempting approach to solving this problem is to seek optimal Nash equilibria, the standard form of equilibria where no…

Using methods from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems we analyze the properties of bimatrix games with random payoffs in the limit where the number of pure strategies of each player tends to infinity. We analytically calculate…

We devise a policy-iteration algorithm for deterministic two-player discounted and mean-payoff games, that runs in polynomial time with high probability, on any input where each payoff is chosen independently from a sufficiently random…

A recent paper by Farina & Pipis (2023) established the existence of uncoupled no-linear-swap regret dynamics with polynomial-time iterations in extensive-form games. The equilibrium points reached by these dynamics, known as linear…