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Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) in classical game theory is a refinement of Nash equilibrium concept. We investigate the consequences when a small group of mutants using quantum strategies try to invade a classical ESS in a population…
The well known refinement of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) called an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is investigated in the quantum Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game that is played using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type setting. Earlier results…
In evolutionary game theory an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept that is sometimes also recognized as evolutionary stability. It is a game-theoretic model, well known to mathematical…
The concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), introduced by Smith and Price, is a refinement of Nash equilibrium in 2-player symmetric games in order to explain counter-intuitive natural phenomena, whose existence is not…
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept in evolutionary game theory. ESS provides an evolutionary stability criterion for biological, social and economical behaviors. In this paper, we develop a new approach to evaluate ESS in…
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an equilibrium strategy that is immune to invasions by rare alternative (``mutant'') strategies. Unlike Nash equilibria, ESS do not always exist in finite games. In this paper we address the…
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) was originally defined as a static concept but later given a dynamic characterization. A well known theorem in evolutionary game theory says that an ESS is an attractor of replicator dynamics but not…
In bi-matrix games the Bishop-Cannings theorem of the classical evolutionary game theory does not permit pure evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) when a mixed ESS exists. We find the necessary form of two-qubit initial quantum states…
Theory of quantum games is a new area of investigation that has gone through rapid development during the last few years. Initial motivation for playing games, in the quantum world, comes from the possibility of re-formulating quantum…
We study the evolutionary stability of Nash equilibria (NE) in a symmetric quantum game played by the recently proposed scheme of applying `identity' and `Pauli spin flip' operators on the initial state with classical probabilities. We show…
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an important solution concept in game theory which has been applied frequently to biological models. Informally an ESS is a strategy that if followed by the population cannot be taken over by a…
The study of evolutionary games with pairwise local interactions has been of interest to many different disciplines. Also local interactions with multiple opponents had been considered, although always for a fixed amount of players. In many…
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is the defining concept of evolutionary game theory. It has a fairly unanimously accepted definition for the case of symmetric games which are played in a homogeneous population where all individuals are…
We quantized the Hawk-Dove game by using the most general form of a pure initial state to investigate the existence of pure and mixed Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS). An example is considered to draw a comparison between classical…
The idea of evolutionarily stable state (ESS) of a population is a cornerstone of evolutionary game theory; moreover, it coincides with the game-theoretic concept of Nash equilibrium. Such a state corresponds to a strategy adopted by the…
We present an algorithm for computing evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in symmetric perfect-recall extensive-form games of imperfect information. Our main algorithm is for two-player games, and we describe how it can be extended to…
As an equilibrium refinement of the Nash equilibrium, evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept in evolutionary game theory and has attracted growing interest. An ESS can be either a pure strategy or a mixed strategy. Even…
We consider a class of continuous-time dynamic games involving a large number of players. Each player selects actions from a finite set and evolves through a finite set of states. State transitions occur stochastically and depend on the…
In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or…
We consider a slightly modified version of the Rock-Scissors-Paper (RSP) game from the point of view of evolutionary stability. In its classical version the game has a mixed Nash equilibrium (NE) not stable against mutants. We find a…