Related papers: Evolutionarily Stable Sets in Quantum Penny Flip G…
Recent extensions to dynamic games of the well-known fictitious play learning procedure in static games were proved to globally converge to stationary Nash equilibria in two important classes of dynamic games (zero-sum and…
Using the Logit quantal response form as the response function in each step, the original definition of static quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is extended into an iterative evolution process. QREs remain as the fixed points of the…
We use co-evolutionary genetic algorithms to model the players' learning process in several Cournot models, and evaluate them in terms of their convergence to the Nash Equilibrium. The "social-learning" versions of the two co-evolutionary…
We propose a simple yet rich model to extend the notions of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of strategic games to the quantum setting, in which we then study the relations between classical and quantum equilibria. Unlike the…
In this paper, we investigate under which conditions normal-form games are (guaranteed to be) strategically equivalent. First, we show for N-player games (N >= 3) that (A) it is NP-hard to decide whether a given strategy is a best response…
In this paper, we formulate an evolutionarymultiple access control game with continuousvariable actions and coupled constraints. We characterize equilibria of the game and show that the pure equilibria are Pareto optimal and also resilient…
Dynamic nonzero sum games are widely used to model multi agent decision making in control, economics, and related fields. Classical methods for computing Nash equilibria, especially in linear quadratic settings, rely on strong structural…
This paper introduces two fundamentally new concepts to game theory: multilateral Nash equilibria and families of games. Starting with non-cooperative games, we show how these notions together seamlessly integrate into and naturally extend…
We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game's payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the…
In multi-agent autonomous systems, deception is a fundamental concept which characterizes the exploitation of unbalanced information to mislead victims into choosing oblivious actions. This effectively alters the system's long term…
In population games, a large population of players, modeled as a continuum, is divided into subpopulations, and the fitness or payoff of each subpopulation depends on the overall population composition. Evolutionary dynamics describe how…
Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…
This paper aims at investigating the problem of fast convergence to the Nash equilibrium (NE) for N-Player noncooperative differential games. The proposed method is such that the players attain their NE point without steady-state…
Using the representation introduced in \cite{frame}, an artificial game in quantum strategy space is proposed and studied. Although it has well-known classical correspondence, which has classical mixture strategy Nash Equilibrium states,…
The finitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma is a good illustration of the discrepancy between the strategic behaviour suggested by a game-theoretic analysis and the behaviour often observed among human players, where cooperation is maintained…
The replicator equation is a simple model of evolution that leads to stable form of Nash Equilibrium, Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). It has been studied in connection with Evolutionary Game Theory and was originally developed for…
In Keynesian Beauty Contests notably modeled by p-guessing games, players try to guess the average of guesses multiplied by p. Convergence of plays to Nash equilibrium has often been justified by agents' learning. However, interrogations…
In the Eisert protocol for 2 X 2 quantum games [Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 3077], a number of authors have investigated the features arising from making the strategic space a two-parameter subset of single qubit unitary operators. We argue that…
This study investigates the properties and stability of the Multiplicative Kantian Equilibrium (MKE) in symmetric games. We first demonstrate that MKE lacks strategic equivalence: the Kantian best-response function is not invariant under…
The multi-population replicator dynamics (RD) can be considered a dynamic approach to the study of multi-player games, where it was shown to be related to Cross' learning, as well as of systems of coevolving populations. However, not all of…