Related papers: Evolutionarily Stable Sets in Quantum Penny Flip G…
We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…
The $N$-player quantum game is analyzed in the context of an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiment. In this setting, a player's strategies are not unitary transformations as in alternate quantum game-theoretic frameworks, but a classical…
In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the…
This paper unifies the concepts of evolutionary games and quantum strategies. First, we state the formulation and properties of classical evolutionary strategies, with focus on the destinations of evolution in 2-player 2-strategy games. We…
We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…
With respect to probabilistic mixtures of the strategies in non-cooperative games, quantum game theory provides guarantee of fixed-point stability, the so-called Nash equilibrium. This permits players to choose mixed quantum strategies that…
We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS). We study the Stackelberg evolutionary game setting in which there is a single leading player and a symmetric population of followers. The leader…
In order to better understand the impact of environmental stochastic fluctuations on the evolution of animal behavior, we introduce the concept of a stochastic Nash equilibrium (SNE) that extends the classical concept of a Nash equilibrium…
Nash Equilibrium (NE) is the canonical solution concept of game theory, which provides an elegant tool to understand the rationalities. Though mixed strategy NE exists in any game with finite players and actions, computing NE in two- or…
We consider game theory from the perspective of quantum algorithms. Strategies in classical game theory are either pure (deterministic) or mixed (probabilistic). We introduce these basic ideas in the context of a simple example, closely…
We investigate the role of quantum mechanical effects in the central stability concept of evolutionary game theory i.e. an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS). Using two and three-player symmetric quantum games we show how the presence of…
We propose a scheme for a quantum game based on performing an EPR type experiment and in which each player's spatial directional choices are considered as their strategies. A classical mixed-strategy game is recovered by restricting the…
We study $n$-player turn-based games played on a finite directed graph. For each play, the players have to pay a cost that they want to minimize. Instead of the well-known notion of Nash equilibrium (NE), we focus on the notion of subgame…
Evolutionary Strategies (ES) are a popular family of black-box zeroth-order optimization algorithms which rely on search distributions to efficiently optimize a large variety of objective functions. This paper investigates the potential…
Evolutionary game theory is a framework to formalize the evolution of collectives ("populations") of competing agents that are playing a game and, after every round, update their strategies to maximize individual payoffs. There are two…
The classical idea of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) modeling animal behavior does not involve any spatial dependence. We considered a spatial Hawk-Dove game played by animals in a patchy environment with wrap around boundaries. We…
We consider evolutionary dynamics for population games in which players have a continuum of strategies at their disposal. Models in this setting amount to infinite-dimensional differential equations evolving on the manifold of probability…
We consider a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, in which players have their own internal state/action spaces while they are coupled through their payoff functions. It is assumed that players' internal chains are driven by independent…
In this paper we study the computational complexity of computing an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in multi-player symmetric games. For two-player games, deciding existence of an ESS is complete for {\Sigma} 2 , the second level of the…
We present an algorithm for computing all evolutionarily stable strategies in nondegenerate normal-form games with three or more players.