Related papers: Unilaterally Competitive Multi-Player Stopping Gam…

Congestion games are a classical type of games studied in game theory, in which n players choose a resource, and their individual cost increases with the number of other players choosing the same resource. In network congestion games…

The Ultimatum Game is conventionally formulated in the context of two players. Nonetheless, real-life scenarios often entail community interactions among numerous individuals. To address this, we introduce an extended version of the…

In this paper, we introduce and study a class of games called price-coupling games that arise in many scenarios, especially in the electricity industry. In a price-coupling game, there is a part of the objective function of a player which…

We consider an n-player symmetric stochastic game with weak interaction between the players. Time is continuous and the horizon and the number of states are finite. We show that the value function of each of the players can be approximated…

This paper studies the limits of empirical means of open-loop Nash equilibria of linear-quadratic stochastic differential games as the number of players goes to infinity, when the corresponding mean field game is of potential type and may…

In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation…

We consider a noncooperative $n$-player principal eigenvalue game which is associated with an infinitesimal generator of a stochastically perturbed multi-channel dynamical system -- where, in the course of such a game, each player attempts…

In this paper we introduce the novel framework of distributionally robust games. These are multi-player games where each player models the state of nature using a worst-case distribution, also called adversarial distribution. Thus each…

We consider a two-person trading game in continuous time whereby each player chooses a constant rebalancing rule $b$ that he must adhere to over $[0,t]$. If $V_t(b)$ denotes the final wealth of the rebalancing rule $b$, then Player 1 (the…

This paper studies relative arbitrage opportunities in a market with competitive investors through stochastic differential games in the limit as the number of players tends to infinity. With common noises introduced by the stock…

We discuss similarities and differences between systems of interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. Long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of spatial games with multiple…

We consider a class of continuous-time dynamic games involving a large number of players. Each player selects actions from a finite set and evolves through a finite set of states. State transitions occur stochastically and depend on the…

This article is devoted to various methods (optimal transport, fixed-point, ordinary differential equations) to obtain existence and/or uniqueness of Cournot-Nash equilibria for games with a continuum of players with both attractive and…

Learning in games discusses the processes where multiple players learn their optimal strategies through the repetition of game plays. The dynamics of learning between two players in zero-sum games, such as Matching Pennies, where their…

The paper is concerned with a variant of the continuous-time finite state Markov game of control and stopping where both players can affect transition rates, while only one player can choose a stopping time. We use the dynamic programming…

We introduce set packing games as an abstraction of situations in which $n$ selfish players select subsets of a finite set of indivisible items, and analyze the quality of several equilibria for this class of games. Assuming that players…

We consider a continuous time stochastic dynamic game between a stopper (Player $1$, the \textit{owner} of an asset yielding an income) and a controller (Player $2$, the \textit{manager} of the asset), where the manager is either effective…

In strategic games such as the prisoner's dilemma, allowing players to make binding offers of utility transfers before play has been shown to alter incentives and potentially support cooperative outcomes. These preplay exchange mechanisms…

We propose a model of interdependent scheduling games in which each player controls a set of services that they schedule independently. A player is free to schedule his own services at any time; however, each of these services only begins…

We address the equilibrium concept of a reverse auction game so that no one can enhance the individual payoff by a unilateral change when all the others follow a certain strategy. In this approach the combinatorial possibilities to consider…