Related papers: Unilaterally Competitive Multi-Player Stopping Gam…

We construct Nash equilibria in feedback form for a class of two-person stochastic games of singular control with absorption, arising from a stylized model for corporate finance. More precisely, the paper focusses on a strategic dynamic…

This paper considers a two-player game where each player chooses a resource from a finite collection of options. Each resource brings a random reward. Both players have statistical information regarding the rewards of each resource.…

We study games with finitely many participants, each having finitely many choices. We consider the following categories of participants: (I) populations: sets of nonatomic agents, (II) atomic splittable players, (III) atomic non splittable…

In this paper, we study one-player and two-player energy mean-payoff games. Energy mean-payoff games are games of infinite duration played on a finite graph with edges labeled by 2-dimensional weight vectors. The objective of the first…

Starting from a heuristic learning scheme for N-person games, we derive a new class of continuous-time learning dynamics consisting of a replicator-like drift adjusted by a penalty term that renders the boundary of the game's strategy space…

We show that the problem of deciding whether in a multi-player perfect information recursive game (i.e. a stochastic game with terminal rewards) there exists a stationary Nash equilibrium ensuring each player a certain payoff is Existential…

We consider a multi-player stochastic differential game with linear McKean-Vlasov dynamics and quadratic cost functional depending on the variance and mean of the state and control actions of the players in open-loop form. Finite and…

We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…

We propose and analyze a broad family of games played by resource-constrained players, which are characterized by the following central features: 1) each user has a multi-dimensional action space, subject to a single sum resource…

One of the most classical games for stochastic processes is the zero-sum Dynkin (stopping) game. We present a complete equilibrium solution to a general formulation of this game with an underlying one-dimensional diffusion. A key result is…

We study the following game. Three players start with initial capitals of $s_{1},s_{2},s_{3}$ dollars; in each round player $P_{m}$ is selected with probability $\frac{1}{3}$; then \emph{he} selects player $P_{n}$ and they play a game in…

Game contingent claims (GCCs) generalize American contingent claims by allowing the writer to recall the option as long as it is not exercised, at the price of paying some penalty. In incomplete markets, an appealing approach is to analyze…

There are only limited classes of multi-player stochastic games in which independent learning is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Markov potential games are a key example of such classes. Prior work has outlined sets of…

We study a game with \emph{strategic} vendors who own multiple items and a single buyer with a submodular valuation function. The goal of the vendors is to maximize their revenue via pricing of the items, given that the buyer will buy the…

We consider Dynkin games for Markov processes associated with semi-Dirichlet forms. Dynkin games are the optimal stopping games introduced as the models of zero-sum games by two players. We prove that the solution to the certain variational…

A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…

We consider a large population dynamic game in discrete time where players are characterized by time-evolving types. It is a natural assumption that the players' actions cannot anticipate future values of their types. Such games go under…

We outline the general construction of three-players games with incomplete information which fulfil the following conditions: (i) symmetry with respect to the exchange of the players; (ii) the existence of the upper bound for total payoff…

We introduce and analyze a natural game formulated as follows. In this one-person game, the player is given a random permutation $A=(a_1,\dots, a_n)$ of a multiset $M$ of $n$ reals that sum up to $0$, where each of the $n!$ permutation…

In this paper, we delve into the problem of using monetary incentives to encourage players to shift from an initial Nash equilibrium to a more favorable one within a game. Our main focus revolves around computing the minimum reward required…