Equilibrium solution to the lowest unique positive integer game
Combinatorics
2010-10-26 v1 Computer Science and Game Theory
Probability
Abstract
We address the equilibrium concept of a reverse auction game so that no one can enhance the individual payoff by a unilateral change when all the others follow a certain strategy. In this approach the combinatorial possibilities to consider become very much involved even for a small number of players, which has hindered a precise analysis in previous works. We here present a systematic way to reach the solution for a general number of players, and show that this game is an example of conflict between the group and the individual interests.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1001.1065,
title = {Equilibrium solution to the lowest unique positive integer game},
author = {Seung Ki Baek and Sebastian Bernhardsson},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1001.1065},
year = {2010}
}
Comments
8 pages, 3 figures