Related papers: False-name-proofness with Bid Withdrawal
Multi-agent debate (MAD) aims to improve large language model (LLM) reasoning by letting multiple agents exchange answers and then aggregate their opinions. Yet recent studies reveal that agents are not neutral: they are prone to…
In online advertising, a set of potential advertisements can be ranked by a certain auction system where usually the top-1 advertisement would be selected and displayed at an advertising space. In this paper, we show a selection bias issue…
We give a simple statistical proof of a binomial identity, by evaluating the Laplace transform of the maximum of n independent exponential random variables in two different ways. As a by product, we obtain a simple proof of an interesting…
One method to offer some bidders a discount in a first-price auction is to augment their bids when selecting a winner but only charge them their original bids should they win. Another method is to use their original bids to select a winner,…
The problem of multiple hypothesis testing arises when there are more than one hypothesis to be tested simultaneously for statistical significance. This is a very common situation in many data mining applications. For instance, assessing…
The voting process is formalized as a multistage voting model with successive alternative elimination. A finite number of agents vote for one of the alternatives each round subject to their preferences. If the number of votes given to the…
By the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem, every reasonable voting rule for three or more alternatives is susceptible to manipulation: there exist elections where one or more voters can change the election outcome in their favour by…
Recent advances in natural language processing have enabled powerful privacy-invasive authorship attribution. To counter authorship attribution, researchers have proposed a variety of rule-based and learning-based text obfuscation…
We introduce a formal framework for analyzing trades in financial markets. An exchange is where multiple buyers and sellers participate to trade. These days, all big exchanges use computer algorithms that implement double sided auctions to…
Bidding strategies that help advertisers determine bidding prices are receiving increasing attention as more and more ad impressions are sold through real-time bidding systems. This paper first describes the problem and challenges of…
Shill bidding occurs when fake bids are introduced into an auction on the seller's behalf in order to artificially inflate the final price. This is typically achieved by the seller having friends bid in her auctions, or the seller controls…
In this paper, we present an automated feature engineering based approach to dramatically reduce false positives in fraud prediction. False positives plague the fraud prediction industry. It is estimated that only 1 in 5 declared as fraud…
We present a quantum auction protocol using superpositions to represent bids and distributed search to identify the winner(s). Measuring the final quantum state gives the auction outcome while simultaneously destroying the superposition.…
We study auctions whose bidders are embedded in a social or economic network. As a result, even bidders who do not win the auction themselves might derive utility from the auction, namely, when a friend wins. On the other hand, when an…
In peer mechanisms, the competitors for a prize also determine who wins. Each competitor may be asked to rank, grade, or nominate peers for the prize. Since the prize can be valuable, such as financial aid, course grades, or an award at a…
The design of privacy mechanisms for two scenarios is studied where the private data is hidden or observable. In the first scenario, an agent observes useful data $Y$, which is correlated with private data $X$, and wants to disclose the…
It has been demonstrated that hidden representation learned by a deep model can encode private information of the input, hence can be exploited to recover such information with reasonable accuracy. To address this issue, we propose a novel…
Given a set of agents qualifying or disqualifying each other, group identification is the task of identifying a socially qualified subgroup of agents. Social qualification depends on the specific rule used to aggregate individual…
We present a general framework for designing approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms for multi-item additive auctions, which applies to both truthful and non-truthful auctions. Given a (not necessarily truthful) single-item auction format…
A rapidly growing literature on lying in behavioral economics and psychology shows that individuals often do not lie even when lying maximizes their utility. In this work, we attempt to incorporate these findings into the theory of…