Related papers: False-name-proofness with Bid Withdrawal

Online transaction fraud presents substantial challenges to businesses and consumers, risking significant financial losses. Conventional rule-based systems struggle to keep pace with evolving fraud tactics, leading to high false positive…

We study mechanisms for selling a single item when buyers have private costs for participating in the mechanism. An agent's participation cost can also be interpreted as an outside option value that she must forego to participate. This…

We analyze a scenario in which software agents implemented as regret-minimizing algorithms engage in a repeated auction on behalf of their users. We study first-price and second-price auctions, as well as their generalized versions (e.g.,…

The model of camera that was used to capture a particular photographic image (model attribution) is typically inferred from high-frequency model-specific artifacts present within the image. Model anonymization is the process of transforming…

We revisit Popper's falsifiability criterion. A tester hires a potential expert to produce a theory, offering payments contingent on the observed performance of the theory. In our model, instead of knowing the true data-generating process,…

This paper is concerned with the question of when a theory is refutable with certainty on the basis of sequence of primitive observations. Beginning with the simple definition of falsifiability as the ability to be refuted by some finite…

We characterize the statistical properties of a large number of online auctions run on eBay. Both stationary and dynamic properties, like distributions of prices, number of bids etc., as well as relations between these quantities are…

We consider a user releasing her data containing some personal information in return of a service. We model user's personal information as two correlated random variables, one of them, called the secret variable, is to be kept private,…

Counterfactual inference considers a hypothetical intervention in a parallel world that shares some evidence with the factual world. If the evidence specifies a conditional distribution on a manifold, counterfactuals may be analytically…

Multiwinner voting rules can be used to select a fixed-size committee from a larger set of candidates. We consider approval-based committee rules, which allow voters to approve or disapprove candidates. In this setting, several voting rules…

Single-shot auctions are commonly used as a means to sell goods, for example when selling ad space or allocating radio frequencies, however devising mechanisms for auctions with multiple bidders and multiple items can be complicated. It has…

A popular framework for false discovery control is the random effects model in which the null hypotheses are assumed to be independent. This paper generalizes the random effects model to a conditional dependence model which allows…

Models of auctions or tendering processes are introduced. In every round of bidding the players select their bid from a probability distribution and whenever a bid is unsuccessful, it is discarded and replaced. For simple models, the…

This paper examines bid requirements, where the government may cancel a procurement contract unless two or more bids are received. Using a first-price auction model with endogenous entry, we compare the bid requirement and reserve price…

In many settings the power of truthful mechanisms is severely bounded. In this paper we use randomization to overcome this problem. In particular, we construct an FPTAS for multi-unit auctions that is truthful in expectation, whereas there…

Both domain names and entire websites are increasingly frequently treated as assets, the value of which can be appraised. The objective of the present thesis was to verify the credibility of domain name appraisals obtained using generally…

Out of the participants in a randomized experiment with anticipated heterogeneous treatment effects, is it possible to identify which subjects have a positive treatment effect? While subgroup analysis has received attention, claims about…

We study a class of manipulations in combinatorial auctions where bidders fundamentally misrepresent what goods they are interested in. Prior work has largely assumed that bidders only submit bids on their bundles of interest, which we call…

This paper considers the design of non-truthful mechanisms from samples. We identify a parameterized family of mechanisms with strategically simple winner-pays-bid, all-pay, and truthful payment formats. In general (not necessarily…

An important aspect of mechanism design in social choice protocols and multiagent systems is to discourage insincere and manipulative behaviour. We examine the computational complexity of false-name manipulation in weighted voting games…