Redeeming Falsifiability?
Theoretical Economics
2026-01-06 v3
Abstract
We revisit Popper's falsifiability criterion. A tester hires a potential expert to produce a theory, offering payments contingent on the observed performance of the theory. In our model, instead of knowing the true data-generating process, the expert knows the state-of-the-art belief over data-generating processes. A non-expert does not. We argue that if the expert can, moreover, acquire additional information to refine this knowledge, falsifiability does have the power to distinguish between experts and non-experts and to identify valuable theories, capitalizing on experts' ability to acquire and refine knowledge.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2303.15723,
title = {Redeeming Falsifiability?},
author = {Mark Whitmeyer and Kun Zhang},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.15723},
year = {2026}
}