Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes
Computer Science and Game Theory
2012-04-12 v3
Abstract
We study auctions whose bidders are embedded in a social or economic network. As a result, even bidders who do not win the auction themselves might derive utility from the auction, namely, when a friend wins. On the other hand, when an enemy or competitor wins, a bidder might derive negative utility. Such spite and altruism will alter the bidding strategies. A simple and natural model for bidders' utilities in these settings posits that the utility of a losing bidder i as a result of bidder j winning is a constant (positive or negative) fraction of bidder j's utility.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1203.5945,
title = {Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes},
author = {Po-An Chen and David Kempe},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1203.5945},
year = {2012}
}
Comments
This version was posted without enough prior discussion with my collaborator. My collaborator would prefer it not to be posted at this time