Related papers: Basic Network Creation Games with Communication In…
The efficient design of networks has been an important engineering task that involves challenging combinatorial optimization problems. Typically, a network designer has to select among several alternatives which links to establish so that…
Strategic interactions between a group of individuals or organisations can be modelled as games played on networks, where a player's payoff depends not only on their actions but also on those of their neighbours. Inferring the network…
In routing games, the network performance at equilibrium can be significantly improved if we remove some edges from the network. This counterintuitive fact, widely known as Braess's paradox, gives rise to the (selfish) network design…
Network games are widely used as a model for selfish resource-allocation problems. In the classical model, each player selects a path connecting her source and target vertices. The cost of traversing an edge depends on the {\em load};…
We consider a setting where individuals interact in a network, each choosing actions which optimize utility as a function of neighbors' actions. A central authority aiming to maximize social welfare at equilibrium can intervene by paying…
In this paper, we model the cost incurred by each peer participating in a peer-to-peer network. Such a cost model allows to gauge potential disincentives for peers to collaborate, and provides a measure of the ``total cost'' of a network,…
This article investigates selfish behavior in games where players are embedded in a social context. A framework is presented which allows us to measure the Windfall of Friendship, i.e., how much players benefit (compared to purely selfish…
We study the sum classic network creation game introduced by Fabrikant et al. in which $n$ players conform a network buying links at individual price $\alpha$. When studying this model we are mostly interested in \emph{Nash equilibria}…
We study a network formation game where $n$ players, identified with the nodes of a directed graph to be formed, choose where to wire their outgoing links in order to maximize their PageRank centrality. Specifically, the action of every…
We study assignment games in which jobs select machines, and in which certain pairs of jobs may conflict, which is to say they may incur an additional cost when they are both assigned to the same machine, beyond that associated with the…
We consider a variation on Maker-Breaker games on graphs or digraphs where the edges have random costs. We assume that Maker wishes to choose the edges of a spanning tree, but wishes to minimise his cost. Meanwhile Breaker wants to make…
Firms in inter-organizational networks such as supply chains or strategic alliances are exposed to interdependent risks. These are risks that are transferable across partner firms. They can be decomposed into intrinsic risks a firm faces…
The behavior of users in social networks is often observed to be affected by the actions of their friends. Bhawalkar et al. \cite{bhawalkar-icalp} introduced a formal mathematical model for user engagement in social networks where each…
J. Hopcroft and D. Sheldon originally introduced network reputation games to investigate the self-interested behavior of web authors who want to maximize their PageRank on a directed web graph by choosing their outlinks in a game theoretic…
In the context of influence propagation in a social graph, we can identify three orthogonal dimensions - the number of seed nodes activated at the beginning (known as budget), the expected number of activated nodes at the end of the…
We consider network aggregative games to model and study multi-agent populations in which each rational agent is influenced by the aggregate behavior of its neighbors, as specified by an underlying network. Specifically, we examine systems…
We introduce Shortest Connection Game, a two-player game played on a directed graph with edge costs. Given two designated vertices in which they start, the players take turns in choosing edges emanating from the vertex they are currently…
We introduce the Funding Game, in which $m$ identical resources are to be allocated among $n$ selfish agents. Each agent requests a number of resources $x_i$ and reports a valuation $\tilde{v}_i(x_i)$, which verifiably {\em lower}-bounds…
We introduce a new kind of percolation on finite graphs called jigsaw percolation. This model attempts to capture networks of people who innovate by merging ideas and who solve problems by piecing together solutions. Each person in a social…
We introduce the problem of finding a spanning tree along with a partition of the tree edges into fewest number of feasible sets, where constraints on the edges define feasibility. The motivation comes from wireless networking, where we…