Related papers: Scalable Mechanisms for Rational Secret Sharing
Correlations distributed by a mediator are usually valued for the coordination they enable between authorized agents, but in adversarial settings a more decisive property is whether the same coordination can be inherited by an outside…
In this work, we study stochastic one-shot games where agents' utilities depend on the collective strategy profiles of other agents as well as on some well-behaved randomness. While each decision-maker is agnostic to the random variable's…
This paper considers a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem, where the players only have partial access to other players' actions, such as their neighbors' actions. Thus, the players are supposed to communicate with each other to…
We consider the decentralized power allocation and spectrum sharing problem in multi-user, multi-channel systems with strategic users. We present a mechanism/game form that has the following desirable features. (1) It is individually…
We study the computational cost of differential privacy in terms of memory efficiency. While the trade-off between accuracy and differential privacy is well-understood, the inherent cost of privacy regarding memory use remains largely…
Scalable oversight, the process by which weaker AI systems supervise stronger ones, has been proposed as a key strategy to control future superintelligent systems. However, it is still unclear how scalable oversight itself scales. To…
This paper studies the stability of communication protocols that deal with transmission errors. We consider a coordination game between an informed sender and an uninformed decision maker, the receiver, who communicate over a noisy channel.…
We consider for the first time a stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem, i.e., with expected-value cost functions and joint feasibility constraints, under partial-decision information, meaning that the agents communicate only with…
In the standard Mechanism Design framework, agents' messages are gathered at a central point and allocation/tax functions are calculated in a centralized manner, i.e., as functions of all network agents' messages. This requirement may cause…
We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender's approval is crucial to…
We introduce an analytical model to study the evolution towards equilibrium in spatial games, with `memory-aware' agents, i.e., agents that accumulate their payoff over time. In particular, we focus our attention on the spatial Prisoner's…
We study pure Nash equilibria in infinite-duration games on graphs, with partial visibility of actions but communication (based on a graph) among the players. We show that a simple communication mechanism consisting in reporting the…
To achieve an optimal outcome in many situations, agents need to choose distinct actions from one another. This is the case notably in many resource allocation problems, where a single resource can only be used by one agent at a time. How…
We consider multiple access games in which primary users are interested in maximizing their confidential data rate at the minimum possible transmission power and secondary users employ eavesdropping as a leverage to maximize their data rate…
In coalitional games, traditional coalitional game theory does not apply if different participants hold different opinions about the payoff function that corresponds to each subset of the coalition. In this paper, we propose a framework in…
The \emph{rational fair consensus problem} can be informally defined as follows. Consider a network of $n$ (selfish) \emph{rational agents}, each of them initially supporting a \emph{color} chosen from a finite set $ \Sigma$. The goal is to…
Public blockchains, though renowned for their transparency and immutability, suffer from significant privacy concerns. Network-level analysis and long-term observation of publicly available transactions can often be used to infer user…
We are concerned with finding Nash Equilibria in agent-based multi-cluster games, where agents are separated into distinct clusters. While the agents inside each cluster collaborate to achieve a common goal, the clusters are considered to…
We prove that there exists a constant $\epsilon>0$ such that, assuming the Exponential Time Hypothesis for PPAD, computing an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player (nXn) game requires quasi-polynomial time,…
We study the problem of answering a workload of linear queries $\mathcal{Q}$, on a database of size at most $n = o(|\mathcal{Q}|)$ drawn from a universe $\mathcal{U}$ under the constraint of (approximate) differential privacy. Nikolov,…