Related papers: Scalable Mechanisms for Rational Secret Sharing
We study a collaborative multi-agent stochastic linear bandit setting, where $N$ agents that form a network communicate locally to minimize their overall regret. In this setting, each agent has its own linear bandit problem (its own reward…
Until now, distributed algorithms for rational agents have assumed a-priori knowledge of $n$, the size of the network. This assumption is challenged here by proving how much a-priori knowledge is necessary for equilibrium in different…
We consider a fundamental game theoretic problem concerning selfish users contributing packets to an M/M/1 queue. In this game, each user controls its own input rate so as to optimize a desired tradeoff between throughput and delay. We…
This paper investigates the equilibrium convergence properties of a proposed algorithm for potential games with continuous strategy spaces in the presence of feedback delays, a main challenge in multi-agent systems that compromises the…
Coordinating the behaviour of self-interested agents in the presence of multiple Nash equilibria is a major research challenge for multi-agent systems. Pre-game communication between all the players can aid coordination in cases where the…
In this paper we study the two player randomized communication complexity of the sparse set disjointness and the exists-equal problems and give matching lower and upper bounds (up to constant factors) for any number of rounds for both of…
We study uniform population protocols: networks of anonymous agents whose pairwise interactions are chosen at random, where each agent uses an identical transition algorithm that does not depend on the population size $n$. Many existing…
A multicast game is a network design game modelling how selfish non-cooperative agents build and maintain one-to-many network communication. There is a special source node and a collection of agents located at corresponding terminals. Each…
Solving strategic games with huge action space is a critical yet under-explored topic in economics, operations research and artificial intelligence. This paper proposes new learning algorithms for solving two-player zero-sum normal-form…
We consider schemes for obtaining truthful reports on a common but hidden signal from large groups of rational, self-interested agents. One example are online feedback mechanisms, where users provide observations about the quality of a…
Sequential allocation is a simple mechanism for sharing multiple indivisible items. We study strategic behavior in sequential allocation. In particular, we consider Nash dynamics, as well as the computation and Pareto optimality of pure…
In game theory, the concept of Nash equilibrium reflects the collective stability of some individual strategies chosen by selfish agents. The concept pertains to different classes of games, e.g. the sequential games, where the agents play…
The central result of classical game theory states that every finite normal form game has a Nash equilibrium, provided that players are allowed to use randomized (mixed) strategies. However, in practice, humans are known to be bad at…
We consider a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, in which players have their own internal state/action spaces while they are coupled through their payoff functions. It is assumed that players' internal chains are driven by independent…
We study a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, namely, stochastic games with independent chains and unknown transition matrices. In this class of games, players control their own internal Markov chains whose transitions do not depend…
We study the problem of computing a Maximal Independent Set (MIS) in distributed networks where each node is a rational agent whose payoff depends on whether it joins the MIS. Classical distributed algorithms assume that nodes follow the…
Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous $N$-player games. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a "population…
This paper considers a game-theoretic formulation of the covert communications problem with finite blocklength, where the transmitter (Alice) can randomly vary her transmit power in different blocks, while the warden (Willie) can randomly…
We develop a game-theoretic framework for predicting and steering the behavior of populations of large language models (LLMs) through Nash equilibrium (NE) analysis. To avoid the intractability of equilibrium computation in open-ended text…
We formulate computation offloading as a decentralized decision-making problem with autonomous agents. We design an interaction mechanism that incentivizes agents to align private and system goals by balancing between competition and…