Related papers: Scalable Mechanisms for Rational Secret Sharing
We model the communication of narratives as a cheap-talk game under model uncertainty. The sender has private information about the true data generating process of publicly observable data. The receiver is uncertain about how to interpret…
As autonomous AI agents increasingly mediate online platform markets, a fundamental question emerges: do these markets generate stable strategic outcomes? In repeated strategic environments, the Nash equilibrium provides a natural benchmark…
Quantum secret-sharing protocols involving N partners (NQSS) are key distribution protocols in which Alice encodes her key into $N-1$ qubits, in such a way that all the other partners must cooperate in order to retrieve the key. On these…
In this work a four terminal Gaussian network composed of a source, a destination, an eavesdropper and a jammer relay is studied. The jammer relay does not hear the source transmission. It assists the eavesdropper and aims to decrease the…
We study the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria of bimatrix games, in a setting where players initially know their own payoffs but not the payoffs of the other player. In order for a solution of reasonable quality to be found,…
Shamir's celebrated secret sharing scheme provides an efficient method for encoding a secret of arbitrary length $\ell$ among any $N \leq 2^\ell$ players such that for a threshold parameter $t$, (i) the knowledge of any $t$ shares does not…
In a social network, individuals express their opinions on several interdependent topics, and therefore the evolution of their opinions on these topics is also mutually dependent. In this work, we propose a differential game model for the…
In large systems, it is important for agents to learn to act effectively, but sophisticated multi-agent learning algorithms generally do not scale. An alternative approach is to find restricted classes of games where simple, efficient…
We are interested in studying how heterogeneous agents can learn to communicate and cooperate with each other without being explicitly pre-programmed to do so. Motivated by this goal, we present and analyze a distributed solution to a…
The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is one of the most prominent randomized rules for the assignment problem. It is well-known for its superior fairness and welfare properties. However, PS is not immune to manipulative behaviour by the…
Designing protocols enhancing cooperation for multi-agent systems remains a grand challenge. Cheap talk, defined as costless, non-binding communication before formal action, serves as a pivotal solution. However, existing theoretical…
We investigate asynchronous distributed algorithms with delayed information for seeking generalized Nash equilibrium over multi-agent networks. The considered game model has all players' local decisions coupled with a shared affine…
We study in this paper privacy protection in fully distributed Nash equilibrium seeking where a player can only access its own cost function and receive information from its immediate neighbors over a directed communication network. In view…
Despite the apparent similarity between shared randomness and shared entanglement in the context of Communication Complexity, our understanding of the latter is not as good as of the former. In particular, there is no known "entanglement…
Generally, system failures, such as crash failures, Byzantine failures and so on, are considered as common reasons for the inconsistencies of distributed consensus and have been extensively studied. In fact, strategic manipulations by…
In a $k$-party communication problem, the $k$ players with inputs $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_k$, respectively, want to evaluate a function $f(x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_k)$ using as little communication as possible. We consider the message-passing…
Low transaction throughput and poor scalability are significant issues in public blockchain consensus protocols such as Bitcoins. Recent research efforts in this direction have proposed shard-based consensus protocols where the key idea is…
We study the problem of fitting the high dimensional sparse linear regression model with sub-Gaussian covariates and responses, where the data are provided by strategic or self-interested agents (individuals) who prioritize their privacy of…
The paper studies an oligopolistic equilibrium model of financial agents who aim to share their random endowments. The risk-sharing securities and their prices are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game played among all…
A (t,n)-threshold secret sharing scheme is a method to distribute a secret among n participants in such a way that any t participants can recover the secret, but no t-1 participants can. In this paper, we propose two secret sharing schemes…