Related papers: Power measures derived from the sequential query p…

Argumentation is a formalism allowing to reason with contradictory information by modeling arguments and their interactions. There are now an increasing number of gradual semantics and impact measures that have emerged to facilitate the…

Voting by sequential elimination is a low-communication voting protocol: voters play in sequence and eliminate one or more of the remaining candidates, until only one remains. While the fairness and efficiency of such protocols have been…

In this research, we discuss a problem of calculating the Shapley value in bankruptcy games. We show that the decision problem of computing the Shapley value in bankruptcy games is NP-complete. We also investigate the relationship between…

In this paper we study rankings induced by power indices of players in simple game models of bicameral legislatures. For a bicameral legislature where bills are passed with a simple majority vote in each house we give a condition involving…

We consider fair and consistent extensions of the Shapley value for games with externalities. Based on the restriction identified by Casajus et al. (2024, Games Econ. Behavior 147, 88-146), we define balanced contributions, Sobolev's…

We study a cooperative game setting where the grand coalition may change since the initial players can invite more players. We focus on monotone games, i.e., adding more players to the grand coalition is not harmful. We model the invitation…

Game theory is the study of tractable games which may be used to model more complex systems. Board games, video games and sports, however, are intractable by design, so "ludological" theories about these games as complex phenomena should be…

This paper proposes a new approach to power in Game Theory. Cooperation and conflict are simulated with a mechanism of payoff alteration, called F-game. Using convex combinations of preferences, an F-game can measure players' attitude to…

We investigate the manipulation of power indices in TU-cooperative games by stimulating (subject to a budget constraint) changes in the propensity of other players to participate to the game. We display several algorithms that show that the…

By algebraic group theory, there is a map from the semisimple conjugacy classes of a finite group of Lie type to the conjugacy classes of the Weyl group. Picking a semisimple class uniformly at random yields a probability measure on…

The main goal of this paper is to settle a conceptual framework for cooperative game theory in which the notion of composition/aggregation of games is the defining structure. This is done via the mathematical theory of algebraic operads: we…

This paper introduces an equilibrium framework based on sequential sampling in which players face strategic uncertainty over their opponents' behavior and acquire informative signals to resolve it. Sequential sampling equilibrium delivers a…

We consider the problem of payoff division in indivisible coalitional games, where the value of the grand coalition is a natural number. This number represents a certain quantity of indivisible objects, such as parliamentary seats, kidney…

Consider a situation with $n$ agents or players where some of the players form a coalition with a certain collective objective. Simple games are used to model systems that can decide whether coalitions are successful (winning) or not…

Population games model the evolution of strategic interactions among a large number of uniform agents. Due to the agents' uniformity and quantity, their aggregate strategic choices can be approximated by the solutions of a class of ordinary…

Definable zero-sum stochastic games involve a finite number of states and action sets, reward and transition functions that are definable in an o-minimal structure. Prominent examples of such games are finite, semi-algebraic or globally…

We deal with coalitional games possessing strictly positive values. Individually rational allocations of such a game has clear fractional interpretations. Many concepts, including the long-existing core and other stability notions more…

We study a tractable two-player contest built on a truncated cubic contest success function. Its defining feature is a strategic-feedback parameter whose sign determines whether a leading player's effort lowers (suppression) or raises…

We present an algorithm that computes approximate pure Nash equilibria in a broad class of constraint satisfaction games that generalize the well-known cut and party affiliation games. Our results improve previous ones by Bhalgat et al.~(EC…

The Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices were first introduced to measure the power of voters in a weighted voting system. Given a weighted voting system, the fixed point of such a system is found by continually reassigning each voter's…