Balanced contributions, consistency, and value for games with externalities
Theoretical Economics
2025-11-06 v1 Computer Science and Game Theory
Combinatorics
Abstract
We consider fair and consistent extensions of the Shapley value for games with externalities. Based on the restriction identified by Casajus et al. (2024, Games Econ. Behavior 147, 88-146), we define balanced contributions, Sobolev's consistency, and Hart and Mas-Colell's consistency for games with externalities, and we show that these properties lead to characterizations of the generalization of the Shapley value introduced by Macho-Stadler et al. (2007, J. Econ. Theory 135, 339-356), that parallel important characterizations of the Shapley value.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2511.03145,
title = {Balanced contributions, consistency, and value for games with externalities},
author = {André Casajus and Yukihiko Funaki and Frank Huettner},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2511.03145},
year = {2025}
}