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We formulate two-party policy competition as a two-player non-cooperative game, generalizing Lin et al.'s work (2021). Each party selects a real-valued policy vector as its strategy from a compact subset of Euclidean space, and a voter's…
This paper studies two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian games in which every player has a private type that is unknown to the other player, and the initial probability of the type of every player is publicly known. The types of players are…
For common notions of correlated equilibrium in extensive-form games, computing an optimal (e.g., welfare-maximizing) equilibrium is NP-hard. Other equilibrium notions -- communication (Forges 1986) and certification (Forges & Koessler…
We study best-response type learning dynamics for zero-sum polymatrix games under two information settings. The two settings are distinguished by the type of information that each player has about the game and their opponents' strategy. The…
Matching games is a novel matching model introduced by Garrido-Lucero and Laraki, in which agents' utilities are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game they play simultaneously with the matching process. Matching games…
We develop value iteration-based algorithms to solve in a unified manner different classes of combinatorial zero-sum games with mean-payoff type rewards. These algorithms rely on an oracle, evaluating the dynamic programming operator up to…
We present a novel polynomial time approximation scheme for two-strategy anonymous games, in which the players' utility functions, although potentially different, do not differentiate among the identities of the other players. Our algorithm…
The known results regarding two-player zero-sum games are naturally generalized in complex space and are presented through a complete compact theory. The payoff function is defined by the real part of the payoff function in the real case,…
Computing Nash equilibrium in multi-agent games is a longstanding challenge at the interface of game theory and computer science. It is well known that a general normal form game in N players and k strategies requires exponential space…
We propose a new class of games, called Multi-Games (MG), in which a given number of players play a fixed number of basic games simultaneously. In each round of the MG, each player will have a specific set of weights, one for each basic…
We study the deterministic and randomized query complexity of finding approximate equilibria in bimatrix games. We show that the deterministic query complexity of finding an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium when $\epsilon < \frac{1}{2}$ is…
This paper deals with the complexity of the problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium for discrete preference games and network coordination games beyond $O(\log n)$-treewidth and tree metric spaces. First, we estimate the number of…
A Nash equilibrium has become important solution concept for analyzing the decision making in Game theory. In this paper, we consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria of a subclass of generic finite normal form games. We define…
Despite the many recent practical and theoretical breakthroughs in computational game theory, equilibrium finding in extensive-form team games remains a significant challenge. While NP-hard in the worst case, there are provably efficient…
We propose a formulation of a general-sum bimatrix game as a bipartite directed graph with the objective of establishing a correspondence between the set of the relevant structures of the graph (in particular elementary cycles) and the set…
Game theory has emerged as a powerful framework for modeling a large range of multi-agent scenarios. Many algorithmic solutions require discrete, finite games with payoffs that have a closed-form specification. In contrast, many real-world…
We consider 2-players, 2-values minimization games where the players' costs take on two values, $a,b$, $a<b$. The players play mixed strategies and their costs are evaluated by unimodal valuations. This broad class of valuations includes…
The distributed computation of equilibria and optima has seen growing interest in a broad collection of networked problems. We consider the computation of equilibria of convex stochastic Nash games characterized by a possibly nonconvex…
In an epsilon-Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most epsilon by changing his behaviour. Recent work has addressed the question of how best to compute epsilon-Nash equilibria, and for what values of epsilon a polynomial-time algorithm…
We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, where the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy augmented by a fixed non-negative bonus for picking a given…