Related papers: A General Framework for Computing Optimal Correlat…
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…
We consider a class of $N$-player games and mean-field games of singular controls with ergodic performance criterion, providing a benchmark case for irreversible investment games featuring mean-field interaction and strategic…
We consider infinite duration alternating move games. These games were previously studied by Roth, Balcan, Kalai and Mansour. They presented an FPTAS for computing an approximated equilibrium, and conjectured that there is a polynomial…
Player-Compatible Equilibrium (PCE) imposes cross-player restrictions on the magnitudes of the players' "trembles" onto different strategies. These restrictions capture the idea that trembles correspond to deliberate experiments by agents…
In this paper, we investigate the problem of optimal supervisory control for the discrete event systems under energy constraints. We consider that the execution of events consumes energy and the energy can be replenished at specific reload…
We study multiplayer turn-based games played on a finite directed graph such that each player aims at satisfying an omega-regular Boolean objective. Instead of the well-known notions of Nash equilibrium (NE) and subgame perfect equilibrium…
We address Stackelberg models of combinatorial congestion games (CCGs); we aim to optimize the parameters of CCGs so that the selfish behavior of non-atomic players attains desirable equilibria. This model is essential for designing such…
With increasing game size, a problem of computational complexity arises. This is especially true in real world problems such as in social systems, where there is a significant population of players involved in the game, and the complexity…
We study the scenario where the players of a classical complete information game initially share an entangled pure quantum state. Each player may perform arbitrary local operations on his own qubits, but no direct communication is allowed.…
This paper deals with the complexity of the problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium for discrete preference games and network coordination games beyond $O(\log n)$-treewidth and tree metric spaces. First, we estimate the number of…
We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria Stackelberg games whose underlying structure is in congestion games, focusing on the case where each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a. singleton congestion games) and one of…
Fractional hedonic games are coalition formation games where a player's utility is determined by the average value they assign to the members of their coalition. These games are a variation of graph hedonic games, which are a class of…
We consider the computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria in graphical games. It is known that the problem is NP-complete in general, but tractable (i.e., in P) for special classes of graphs such as those with bounded treewidth. It…
Competitive equilibrium (CE) for chores has recently attracted significant attention, with many algorithms proposed to approximately compute it. However, existing algorithms either lack iterate convergence guarantees to an exact CE or…
Simple adaptive procedures that converge to correlated equilibria are known to exist for normal form games (Hart and Mas-Colell 2000), but no such analogue exists for extensive-form games. Leveraging inspiration from Zinkevich et al.…
In a discrete space and time framework, we study the mean field game limit for a class of symmetric $N$-player games based on the notion of correlated equilibrium. We give a definition of correlated solution that allows to construct…
We exhibit the rich structure of the set of correlated equilibria by analyzing the simplest of polynomial games: the mixed extension of matching pennies. We show that while the correlated equilibrium set is convex and compact, the structure…
The Unique Games Conjecture (UGC) constitutes a highly dynamic subarea within computational complexity theory, intricately linked to the outstanding P versus NP problem. Despite multiple insightful results in the past few years, a proof for…
Coordination in multiplayer games enables players to avoid the lose-lose outcome that often arises at Nash equilibria. However, designing a coordination mechanism typically requires the consideration of the joint actions of all players,…
We introduce two min-max problems: the first problem is to minimize the supremum of finitely many rational functions over a compact basic semi-algebraic set whereas the second problem is a 2-player zero-sum polynomial game in randomized…