Related papers: A General Framework for Computing Optimal Correlat…
The main ambition of this thesis is to contribute to the development of cooperative game theory towards combinatorics, algorithmics and discrete geometry. Therefore, the first chapter of this manuscript is devoted to highlighting the…
Computational game theory has many applications in the modern world in both adversarial situations and the optimization of social good. While there exist many algorithms for computing solutions in two-player interactions, finding optimal…
Many interactions result in a socially suboptimal equilibrium, or in a non-equilibrium state, from which arriving at an equilibrium through simple dynamics can be impossible of too long. Aiming to achieve a certain equilibrium, we persuade,…
Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…
Representation languages for coalitional games are a key research area in algorithmic game theory. There is an inherent tradeoff between how general a language is, allowing it to capture more elaborate games, and how hard it is…
We study N-player finite games with costs perturbed due to time-varying disturbances in the underlying system and to that end, we propose the concept of Robust Correlated Equilibrium that generalizes the definition of Correlated…
For common notions of correlated equilibrium in extensive-form games, computing an optimal (e.g., welfare-maximizing) equilibrium is NP-hard. Other equilibrium notions -- communication (Forges 1986) and certification (Forges & Koessler…
An elegant characterization of the complexity of constraint satisfaction problems has emerged in the form of the the algebraic dichotomy conjecture of [BKJ00]. Roughly speaking, the characterization asserts that a CSP {\Lambda} is tractable…
Two-team zero-sum games are one of the most important paradigms in game theory. In this paper, we focus on finding an unexploitable equilibrium in large team games. An unexploitable equilibrium is a worst-case policy, where members in the…
The security game is a basic model for resource allocation in adversarial environments. Here there are two players, a defender and an attacker. The defender wants to allocate her limited resources to defend critical targets and the attacker…
We introduce a new approach for computing optimal equilibria via learning in games. It applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design, information design, and solution concepts such as correlated,…
We study the iteration complexity of decentralized learning of approximate correlated equilibria in incomplete information games. On the negative side, we prove that in $\mathit{extensive}$-$\mathit{form}$ $\mathit{games}$, assuming…
Coarse correlation models strategic interactions of rational agents complemented by a correlation device, that is a mediator that can recommend behavior but not enforce it. Despite being a classical concept in the theory of normal-form…
While Nash equilibrium in extensive-form games is well understood, very little is known about the properties of extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE), both from a behavioral and from a computational point of view. In this setting,…
This paper studies the connection between a class of mean-field games and a social welfare optimization problem. We consider a mean-field game in function spaces with a large population of agents, and each agent seeks to minimize an…
This paper presents a technique for approximating, up to any precision, the set of subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) in discounted repeated games. The process starts with a single hypercube approximation of the set of SPE. Then the initial…
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…
We study multiplayer reachability games played on a finite directed graph equipped with target sets, one for each player. In those reachability games, it is known that there always exists a Nash equilibrium (NE) and a subgame perfect…
In order to coordinate players in a game must first identify a target pattern of behaviour. In this paper we investigate the difficulty of identifying prominent outcomes in two kinds of binary action coordination problems in social…
In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced combinatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as incentive-compatible as possible. This…