Related papers: A General Framework for Computing Optimal Correlat…
This paper introduces and studies the optimal control problem with equilibrium constraints (OCPEC). The OCPEC is an optimal control problem with a mixed state and control equilibrium constraint formulated as a complementarity constraint and…
The model of congestion games is widely used to analyze games related to traffic and communication. A central property of these games is that they are potential games and hence posses a pure Nash equilibrium. In reality it is often the case…
Congestion games constitute an important class of games in which computing an exact or even approximate pure Nash equilibrium is in general {\sf PLS}-complete. We present a surprisingly simple polynomial-time algorithm that computes…
In this paper we formulate the homogeneous two- and three-dimensional self-reconfiguration problem over discrete grids as a constrained potential game. We develop a game-theoretic learning algorithm based on the Metropolis-Hastings…
We study multiplayer turn-based timed games with reachability objectives. In particular, we are interested in the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). We prove that deciding the constrained existence of an SPE in this setting is…
We study the problem of finding robust equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with mean payoff objectives. A $(k,t)$-robust equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no coalition of size $k$ can improve the payoff of one its member by…
Characterizing the performance of no-regret dynamics in multi-player games is a foundational problem at the interface of online learning and game theory. Recent results have revealed that when all players adopt specific learning algorithms,…
In this paper, we consider a large class of hierarchical congestion population games. One can show that the equilibrium in a game of such type can be described as a minimum point in a properly constructed multi-level convex optimization…
Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…
We consider linear problems in the worst case setting. That is, given a linear operator and a pool of admissible linear measurements, we want to approximate the values of the operator uniformly on a convex and balanced set by means of…
This paper considers games where the utilities for agents are the sum of a term proportional to a social utility, and another term that is an individual cost or reward. The agents are assumed to be irrational in their perception of the…
In multiplayer games, self-interested behavior among the players can harm the social welfare. Tax mechanisms are a common method to alleviate this issue and induce socially optimal behavior. In this work, we take the initial step of…
We prove the existence of approximate correlated equilibrium of support size polylogarithmic in the number of players and the number of actions per player. In particular, using the probabilistic method, we show that there exists a multiset…
We study the computational complexity of the problem of computing local min-max equilibria of games with a nonconvex-nonconcave utility function $f$. From the work of Daskalakis, Skoulakis, and Zampetakis [DSZ21], this problem was known to…
In cooperative game theory, the social configurations of players are modeled by balanced collections. The Bondareva-Shapley theorem, perhaps the most fundamental theorem in cooperative game theory, characterizes the existence of solutions…
We investigate a new class of congestion games, called Totally Unimodular (TU) Congestion Games, where the players' strategies are binary vectors inside polyhedra defined by totally unimodular constraint matrices. Network congestion games…
We study the equilibrium computation problem for two classical resource allocation games: atomic splittable congestion games and multimarket Cournot oligopolies. For atomic splittable congestion games with singleton strategies and…
We initiate the study of trembling-hand perfection in sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games with correlation. We introduce the extensive-form perfect correlated equilibrium (EFPCE) as a refinement of the classical extensive-form…
Computing Nash equilibrium in multi-agent games is a longstanding challenge at the interface of game theory and computer science. It is well known that a general normal form game in N players and k strategies requires exponential space…
The ergodic equation is a basic tool in the study of mean-payoff stochastic games. Its solvability entails that the mean payoff is independent of the initial state. Moreover, optimal stationary strategies are readily obtained from its…