Related papers: Strategic delegation in a sequential model with mu…

We study Stackelberg (leader--follower) tuning of network parameters (tolls, capacities, incentives) in combinatorial congestion games, where selfish users choose discrete routes (or other combinatorial strategies) and settle at a…

This paper studies a delegation problem faced by the planner who wants to regulate receivers' reaction choices in markets for matching between receivers and senders with signaling. We provide a noble insight into the planner's willingness…

We study a stochastic process that mimics single-game elimination tournaments. In our model, the outcome of each match is stochastic: the weaker player wins with upset probability q<=1/2, and the stronger player wins with probability 1-q.…

Human cooperation depends on how accurately we infer others' motives--how much they value fairness, generosity, or self-interest from the choices they make. We model that process in binary dictator games, which isolate moral trade-offs…

Motivated by models of epidemic control in large populations, we consider a Stackelberg mean field game model between a principal and a mean field of agents evolving on a finite state space. The agents play a non-cooperative game in which…

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information…

In this paper, we consider a discrete-time Stackelberg mean field game with a finite number of leaders, a finite number of major followers and an infinite number of minor followers. The leaders and the followers each observe types privately…

In recent years, various decentralized organizational forms have emerged, posing a challenge for organizational design. Some design elements, such as task allocation, become emergent properties that cannot be fully controlled from the top…

We analyze the delegation of pricing by participants, representing firms, to a collusive, self-learning algorithm in a repeated Bertrand experiment. In the baseline treatment, participants set prices themselves. In the other treatments,…

We investigate a multi-agent decision-making problem where a large population of agents is responsible for carrying out a set of assigned tasks. The amount of jobs in each task varies over time governed by a dynamical system model. Each…

An important question in economics is how people choose between different payments in the future. The classical normative model predicts that a decision maker discounts a later payment relative to an earlier one by an exponential function…

This paper studies continuous-time optimal contracting in a hierarchy problem which generalises the model of Sung (2015). The hierarchy is modeled by a series of interlinked principal-agent problems, leading to a sequence of Stackelberg…

We study the problem of finding Stackelberg equilibria in games with a massive number of players. So far, the only known game instances in which the problem is solved in polynomial time are some particular congestion games. However, a…

This chapter examines the link between delegation and lobbying, two themes central to political economy. Delegation models explore how legislatures manage uncertainty and control bureaucratic agents, while lobbying models analyze how…

This paper characterizes optimal classification when individuals adjust their behavior in response to the classification rule. We model the interaction between a designer and a population as a Stackelberg game: the designer selects a…

Multi-agent systems (MAS) are increasingly applied to complex task allocation in two-sided markets, where agents such as companies and customers interact dynamically. Traditional company-led Stackelberg game models, where companies set…

We study the effect of interim feedback policies in a dynamic all-pay auction where two players bid over two stages to win a common-value prize. We show that sequential equilibrium outcomes are characterized by Cheapest Signal Equilibria,…

We study a recently proposed model in which an odd number of agents are competing to be in the minority. The agents have one strategy in hand which is to follow the most recent history. Each agent is also assigned a value p, which is the…

This article considers a problem arising from a two-player game based on the classical secretary problem. First, Player 1 selects one object from a sequence as in the secretary problem. All of the other objects are then presented to Player…

Autocurricular training is an important sub-area of multi-agent reinforcement learning~(MARL) that allows multiple agents to learn emergent skills in an unsupervised co-evolving scheme. The robotics community has experimented autocurricular…