Related papers: Strategic delegation in a sequential model with mu…
We consider a strategic M/M/1 queueing model under a first-come-first-served regime, where customers are split into two classes and class $A$ has priority over class $B$. Customers can decide whether to join the queue or balk, and, in case…
Inspired by a military context, we study a Stackelberg production game where a country's government, the leader, wants to maximize the production of military assets. The leader does so by allocating his resources among a set of production…
This paper is concerned with a three-level multi-leader-follower incentive Stackelberg game with $H_\infty$ constraint. Based on $H_2/H_\infty$ control theory, we firstly obtain the worst-case disturbance and the team-optimal strategy by…
The Stackelberg game depicts a leader-follower relationship wherein decisions are made sequentially, and the Stackelberg equilibrium represents an expected optimal solution when the leader can anticipate the rational response of the…
In the context of reducing carbon emissions in the automotive supply chain, collaboration between vehicle manufacturers and retailers has proven to be an effective measure for enhancing carbon emission reduction within the enterprise. This…
This paper demonstrates the quantization of a spatial Cournot duopoly model with product choice, a two stage game focusing on non-cooperation in locations and quantities. With quantization, the players can access a continuous set of…
The Stackelberg game model, where a leader commits to a strategy and the follower best responds, has found widespread application, particularly to security problems. In the security setting, the goal is for the leader to compute an optimal…
The Li-Du-Massar quantum duopoly model is one of the generally accepted quantum game schemes. It has applications in a wide range of duopoly problems. Our purpose is to study Stackelberg's duopoly with incomplete information in the quantum…
Gallice and Monz\'on (2019) present a natural environment that sustains full co-operation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. They demonstrate that in a sequential public goods game, where agents…
In a delegation problem, a principal P with commitment power tries to pick one out of $n$ options. Each option is drawn independently from a known distribution. Instead of inspecting the options herself, P delegates the information…
How do incentive levels affect strategic behaviour? We address this with an experiment that separately identifies own- and opponent-incentive effects in two dominance-solvable games that differ in strategic complexity. Higher own incentives…
We consider a model where agents differ in their `types' which determines their voluntary contribution towards a public good. We analyze what the equilibrium composition of groups are under centralized and centralized choice. We show that…
The $1-N$ generalized Stackelberg game (single-leader multi-follower game) is intricately intertwined with the interaction between a leader and followers (hierarchical interaction) and the interaction among followers (simultaneous…
This paper explores the economic interactions within modern crowdsourcing markets. In these markets, employers issue requests for tasks, platforms facilitate the recruitment of crowd workers, and workers complete tasks for monetary rewards.…
Decision-makers in high-stakes selection processes often face a fundamental choice: whether to make decisions themselves or to delegate authority to another entity whose incentives may only be partially aligned with their own. Such…
Sequential allocation is a simple mechanism for sharing multiple indivisible items. We study strategic behavior in sequential allocation. In particular, we consider Nash dynamics, as well as the computation and Pareto optimality of pure…
In many settings of interest, a policy is set by one party, the leader, in order to influence the action of another party, the follower, where the follower's response is determined by some private information. A natural question to ask is,…
Recent results in the ML community have revealed that learning algorithms used to compute the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in a Stackelberg game, are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. Such a learning algorithm…
We consider Incentive Decision Processes, where a principal seeks to reduce its costs due to another agent's behavior, by offering incentives to the agent for alternate behavior. We focus on the case where a principal interacts with a…
In economics duopoly is a market dominated by two firms large enough to influence the market price. Stackelberg presented a dynamic form of duopoly that is also called `leader-follower' model. We give a quantum perspective on Stackelberg…