Related papers: Strategic delegation in a sequential model with mu…
Winners-take-all situations introduce an incentive for agents to diversify their behavior, since doing so will result in splitting an eventual price with fewer people. At the same time, when the payoff of a process depends on a parameter…
We study a continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg game in which a leader seeks to accomplish a primary objective while inferring a hidden parameter of a rational follower. The follower solves an entropy-regularized tracking problem and…
This contribution deals with a two-level discrete decision problem, a so-called Stackelberg strategic game: A Subset Sum setting is addressed with a set $N$ of items with given integer weights. One distinguished player, the leader, may…
Opportunities such as higher education can promote intergenerational mobility, leading individuals to achieve levels of socioeconomic status above that of their parents. We develop a dynamic model for allocating such opportunities in a…
We ask when a normal-form game yields a single equilibrium prediction, even if players can coordinate by delegating play to an intermediary such as a platform or a cartel. Delegation outcomes are modeled via coarse correlated equilibria…
We consider a multi-agent delegation mechanism without money. In our model, given a set of agents, each agent has a fixed number of solutions which is exogenous to the mechanism, and privately sends a signal, e.g., a subset of solutions, to…
We address a new prize-collecting problem of routing commodities in a given network with hub and non-hub nodes, in which the service of the non-hub nodes will be outsourced to third-party carriers. The problem is modeled as a Stackelberg…
Strategic classification studies the problem where self-interested individuals or agents manipulate their response to obtain favorable decision outcomes made by classifiers, typically turning to dishonest actions when they are less costly…
Prevailing methods of course allocation at undergraduate institutions involve reserving seats to give priority to designated groups of students. We introduce a competitive equilibrium-based mechanism that assigns course seats using student…
We develop an analytically tractable model featuring heterogeneous workers and firms, where labor markets clear through a one-to-many sorting mechanism. Firms determine both the number and composition of their employees, shaping (1) the…
In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), self-interested agents attempt to establish equilibrium and achieve coordination depending on game structure. However, existing MARL approaches are mostly bound by the simultaneous actions of…
Strategic classification studies the problem where self-interested individuals or agents manipulate their response to obtain favorable decision outcomes made by classifiers, typically turning to dishonest actions when they are less costly…
When allocating indivisible items to agents, it is known that the only strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy a set of rather mild conditions are constrained serial dictatorships: given a fixed order over agents, at each step the designated…
We consider a team-production environment where all participants are motivated by career concerns, and where a team's joint productive outcome may have different reputational implications for different team members. In this context, we…
In this paper, we establish a dynamic game to allocate CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) to the members of a supply chain. We propose a model of three-tier supply chain in decentralized state that is including supplier, manufacturer and…
We study a class of games in which a finite number of agents each controls a quantity of flow to be routed through a network, and are able to split their own flow between multiple paths through the network. Recent work on this model has…
We investigate a co-design problem, encompassing simultaneous design of system infrastructure and control, through a game-theoretical framework. To this end, we propose the co-design problem as a two-layer hierarchical strategic…
In this paper, we establish a dynamic game to allocate CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) to the members of a supply chain. We propose a model of a three-tier supply chain in a decentralized state which includes a supplier, a…
We provide a general approach to reformulating any continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg differential game under closed-loop strategies as a single-level optimisation problem with target constraints. More precisely, we consider a…
The paper discusses the strategy-proofness of sports tournaments with multiple group stages, where the results of matches already played in the previous round against teams in the same group are carried over. These tournaments, widely used…