Related papers: Strategic delegation in a sequential model with mu…
Computational advertising has been studied to design efficient marketing strategies that maximize the number of acquired customers. In an increased competitive market, however, a market leader (a leader) requires the acquisition of new…
We propose a payoff function extending Minority Games (MG) that captures the competition between agents to make money. In constrast with previous MG, the best strategies are not always targeting the minority but are shifting…
We introduce a reinforcement learning framework for economic design where the interaction between the environment designer and the participants is modeled as a Stackelberg game. In this game, the designer (leader) sets up the rules of the…
A principal contracts with an agent through an informed delegate. Although the principal cannot directly mediate the interaction, she can restrict the menus of contracts the delegate may offer. We characterize the outcomes implementable…
We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria Stackelberg games whose underlying structure is in congestion games, focusing on the case where each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a. singleton congestion games) and one of…
This paper investigates inventory management in a multi channel distribution system consisting of one manufacturer and an arbitrary number of retailers that face stochastic demand. Existence of the pure Nash equilibrium is proved and…
We examine vote delegation when preferences of agents are private information. One group of agents (delegators) does not want to participate in voting and abstains under conventional voting or can delegate its votes to the other group…
We study a multi-agent setting in which brokers transact with an informed trader. Through a sequential Stackelberg-type game, brokers manage trading costs and adverse selection with an informed trader. In particular, supplying liquidity to…
A growing body of work in game theory extends the traditional Stackelberg game to settings with one leader and multiple followers who play a Nash equilibrium. Standard approaches for computing equilibria in these games reformulate the…
Consider the following multi-phase project management problem. Each project is divided into several phases. All projects enter the next phase at the same point chosen by the decision maker based on observations up to that point. Within each…
This work studies a dynamic mechanism design problem in which a principal delegates decision makings to a group of privately-informed agents without the monetary transfer or burning. We consider that the principal privately possesses…
When interacting with other decision-making agents in non-adversarial scenarios, it is critical for an autonomous agent to have inferable behavior: The agent's actions must convey their intention and strategy. We model the inferability…
Behavioral experiments on the ultimatum game (UG) reveal that we humans prefer fair acts, which contradicts the prediction made in orthodox Economics. Existing explanations, however, are mostly attributed to exogenous factors within the…
Strategic classification studies the design of a classifier robust to the manipulation of input by strategic individuals. However, the existing literature does not consider the effect of competition among individuals as induced by the…
One of the most direct human mechanisms of promoting cooperation is rewarding it. We study the effect of sharing a reward among cooperators in the most stringent form of social dilemma, namely the Prisoner's Dilemma. Specifically, for a…
We consider two-player iterated survival games in which players may switch from a more cooperative behavior to a less cooperative one at some step of the game. Payoffs are survival probabilities and lone individuals have to finish the game…
Mobility systems are complex socio-technical environments influenced by multiple stakeholders with hierarchically interdependent decisions, rendering effective control and policy design inherently challenging. We bridge hierarchical…
Agents exert hidden effort to produce randomly-sized innovations in a technology they share. Flow payoffs grow as the technology develops, but so does the marginal cost of effort. I characterise the unique symmetric MPE with the quality of…
This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley's foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We focus on markets where agents have utility functions and…
We consider preference communication in two-player multi-objective normal-form games. In such games, the payoffs resulting from joint actions are vector-valued. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume there exists a utility function for…