Related papers: Online Cake Cutting (published version)
We study the classic cake cutting problem from a mechanism design perspective, in particular focusing on deterministic mechanisms that are strategyproof and fair. We begin by looking at mechanisms that are non-wasteful and primarily show…
We study the paradigmatic fair division problem of allocating a divisible good among agents with heterogeneous preferences, commonly known as cake cutting. Classical cake cutting protocols are susceptible to manipulation. Do their strategic…
We characterize methods of dividing a cake between two bidders in a way that is incentive-compatible and Pareto-efficient. In our cake cutting model, each bidder desires a subset of the cake (with a uniform value over this subset), and is…
The fair division literature in economics considers how to divide resources between multiple agents such that the allocation is envy-free: each agent receives their favorite piece. Researchers have developed a variety of fair division…
Envy-free cake-cutting protocols procedurally divide an infinitely divisible good among a set of agents so that no agent prefers another's allocation to their own. These protocols are highly complex and difficult to prove correct. Recently,…
Classic cake-cutting algorithms enable people with different preferences to divide among them a heterogeneous resource (``cake''), such that the resulting division is fair according to each agent's individual preferences. However, these…
In this note we study a problem of fair division in the absence of full information. We give an algorithm which solves the following problem: n $\ge$ 2 persons want to cut a cake into n shares so that each person will get at least 1/n of…
We study the disproportionate version of the classical cake-cutting problem: how efficiently can we divide a cake, here $[0,1]$, among $n$ agents with different demands $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_n$ summing to $1$? When all the…
We study the recently introduced cake-cutting setting in which the cake is represented by an undirected graph. This generalizes the canonical interval cake and allows for modeling the division of road networks. We show that when the graph…
Two simple and attractive mechanisms for the fair division of indivisible goods in an online setting are LIKE and BALANCED LIKE. We study some fundamental computational problems concerning the outcomes of these mechanisms. In particular, we…
We consider the well-studied cake cutting problem in which the goal is to identify a fair allocation based on a minimal number of queries from the agents. The problem has attracted considerable attention within various branches of computer…
In this article we propose a probabilistic framework in order to study the fair division of a divisible good, e.g., a cake, between n players. Our framework follows the same idea than the ''Full independence model'' used in the study of…
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous cake between a number of players with different tastes. In this setting, it is known that fairness requirements may result in a suboptimal division from the social welfare…
We study the existence of fair distributions when we have more guests than pieces to allocate, focusing on envy-free distributions among those who receive a piece. The conditions on the demand from the guests can be weakened from those of…
We consider the classic cake-cutting problem of producing envy-free allocations, restricted to the case of four agents. The problem asks for a partition of the cake to four agents, so that every agent finds her piece at least as valuable as…
We study classic cake-cutting problems, but in discrete models rather than using infinite-precision real values, specifically, focusing on their communication complexity. Using general discrete simulations of classical infinite-precision…
Cake cutting is one of the most fundamental settings in fair division and mechanism design without money. In this paper, we consider different levels of three fundamental goals in cake cutting: fairness, Pareto optimality, and…
We survey a burgeoning and promising new research area that considers the online nature of many practical fair division problems. We identify wide variety of such online fair division problems, as well as discuss new mechanisms and…
We consider fair division problems where indivisible items arrive one-by-one in an online fashion and are allocated immediately to agents who have additive utilities over these items. Many existing offline mechanisms do not work in this…
We study the classic problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous and divisible resource -- represented by a cake, $[0,1]$ -- among $n$ agents. This work considers an interesting variant of the problem where agents are embedded on a graph.…