Related papers: Online Cake Cutting (published version)
Behavioural economists have shown that people are often averse to inequality and will make choices to avoid unequal outcomes. In this paper, we consider how to allocate indivisible goods fairly so as to minimize inequality. We consider how…
Though competitive analysis is often a very good tool for the analysis of online algorithms, sometimes it does not give any insight and sometimes it gives counter-intuitive results. Much work has gone into exploring other performance…
Single minded agents have strict preferences, in which a bundle is acceptable only if it meets a certain demand. Such preferences arise naturally in scenarios such as allocating computational resources among users, where the goal is to…
We consider online scheduling on multiple machines for jobs arriving one-by-one with the objective of minimizing the makespan. For any number of identical parallel or uniformly related machines, we provide a competitive-ratio approximation…
We address the problem of fair division, or cake cutting, with the goal of finding truthful mechanisms. In the case of a general measure space ("cake") and non-atomic, additive individual preference measures - or utilities - we show that…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents in an online setting, where goods arrive sequentially and must be allocated irrevocably. Focusing on the popular fairness notions of envy-freeness, proportionality, and…
This paper considers a novel variant of the online fair division problem involving multiple agents in which a learner sequentially observes an indivisible item that has to be irrevocably allocated to one of the agents while satisfying a…
A fundamental result in cake cutting states that for any number of players with arbitrary preferences over a cake, there exists a division of the cake such that every player receives a single contiguous piece and no player is left envious.…
Cake-cutting protocols aim at dividing a ``cake'' (i.e., a divisible resource) and assigning the resulting portions to several players in a way that each of the players feels to have received a ``fair'' amount of the cake. An important…
In online recommendation, customers arrive in a sequential and stochastic manner from an underlying distribution and the online decision model recommends a chosen item for each arriving individual based on some strategy. We study how to…
Fair division is the problem of dividing one or several goods amongst two or more agents in a way that satisfies a suitable fairness criterion. These Notes provide a succinct introduction to the field. We cover three main topics. First, we…
Relying on configuration spaces and equivariant topology, we study a general "cooperative envy-free division problem". A group of players want to cut a "cake" $I=[0,1]$ and divide among themselves the pieces in an envy-free manner. Once the…
In this paper we study the mincut problem in the online setting. We consider two distinct models: A) competitive analysis and B) regret analysis. In the competitive setting we consider the vertex arrival model; whenever a new vertex arrives…
A perfectly divisible cake is to be divided among a group of agents. Each agent is entitled to a share between zero and one, and these entitlements are compatible in that they sum to one. The mediator does not know the preferences of the…
In an online fair allocation problem, a sequence of indivisible items arrives online and needs to be allocated to offline agents immediately and irrevocably. In our paper, we study the online allocation of either goods or chores. We employ…
We consider the classic cake-cutting problem of producing fair allocations for $n$ agents, in the Robertson-Webb query model. In this model, it is known that: (i) proportional allocations can be computed using $O(n \log n)$ queries, and…
There is a heterogeneous resource that contains both good parts and bad parts, for example, a cake with some parts burnt, a land-estate with some parts heavily taxed, or a chore with some parts fun to do. The resource has to be divided…
We study the envy-free cake-cutting problem for $d+1$ players with $d$ cuts, for both the oracle function model and the polynomial time function model. For the former, we derive a $\theta(({1\over\epsilon})^{d-1})$ time matching bound for…
A cake has to be divided fairly among $n$ agents. When all agents have equal entitlements, it is known that such a division can be implemented with $n-1$ cuts. When agents may have different entitlements, the paper shows that at least $2 n…
We consider the problem of envy-free cake cutting, which is the distribution of a continuous heterogeneous resource among self interested players such that nobody prefers what somebody else receives to what they get. Existing work has…