Incentive Compatible Two Player Cake Cutting
Computer Science and Game Theory
2012-10-02 v1
Abstract
We characterize methods of dividing a cake between two bidders in a way that is incentive-compatible and Pareto-efficient. In our cake cutting model, each bidder desires a subset of the cake (with a uniform value over this subset), and is allocated some subset. Our characterization proceeds via reducing to a simple one-dimensional version of the problem, and yields, for example, a tight bound on the social welfare achievable.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1210.0155,
title = {Incentive Compatible Two Player Cake Cutting},
author = {Avishay Maya and Noam Nisan},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1210.0155},
year = {2012}
}
Comments
19 pages, WINE 2012