Fairness and Efficiency in Cake-Cutting with Single-Peaked Preferences
Computer Science and Game Theory
2020-03-05 v3 Theoretical Economics
Abstract
We study the cake-cutting problem when agents have single-peaked preferences over the cake. We show that a recently proposed mechanism by Wang-Wu (2019) to obtain envy-free allocations can yield large welfare losses. Using a simplifying assumption, we characterize all Pareto optimal allocations, which have a simple structure: are peak-preserving and non-wasteful. Finally, we provide simple alternative mechanisms that Pareto dominate that of Wang-Wu, and which achieve envy-freeness or Pareto optimality.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2002.03174,
title = {Fairness and Efficiency in Cake-Cutting with Single-Peaked Preferences},
author = {Bhavook Bhardwaj and Rajnish Kumar and Josue Ortega},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.03174},
year = {2020}
}
Comments
Forthcoming in Economics Letters