Related papers: Parameterized Two-Player Nash Equilibrium
Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions,…
Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…
In an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most $\epsilon$ by unilaterally changing his behaviour. For two-player (bimatrix) games with payoffs in $[0,1]$, the best-known$\epsilon$ achievable in polynomial time is 0.3393. In…
We revisit the complexity of deciding, given a {\it bimatrix game,} whether it has a {\it Nash equilibrium} with certain natural properties; such decision problems were early known to be ${\mathcal{NP}}$-hard~\cite{GZ89}. We show that…
The number of Nash equilibria of the mixed extension of a generic finite game in normal form is finite and odd. This raises the question how large the number can be, depending on the number of players and the numbers of their pure…
We introduce a framework for stochastic games on large sparse graphs, covering continuous-time and discrete-time dynamic games as well as static games. Players are indexed by the vertices of simple, locally finite graphs, allowing both…
Multi-leader multi-follower games are a class of hierarchical games in which a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium…
We consider two-player normal form games where each player has the same finite strategy set. The payoffs of each player are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with a continuous distribution. We show that, with high probability, the…
Considering infinite-horizon, discrete-time, linear quadratic, N-player dynamic games with scalar dynamics, a graphical representation of feedback Nash equilibrium solutions is provided. This representation is utilised to derive conditions…
In this paper, we consider the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a multi-player game over generally connected networks. This model differs from a conventional setting in that players have partial information on the actions of their…
Nash equilibrium is a popular solution concept for solving imperfect-information games in practice. However, it has a major drawback: it does not preclude suboptimal play in branches of the game tree that are not reached in equilibrium.…
We are interested in the study of stochastic games for which each player faces an optimal stopping problem. In our setting, the players may interact through the criterion to optimise as well as through their dynamics. After briefly…
While Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist, they may exhibit dense support, making them difficult to understand and execute in some applications. In this paper, we study $k$-sparse commitments in games where one player is restricted to…
In this note we provide a new proof for the results of Lipton et al. on the existence of an approximate Nash equilibrium with logarithmic support size. Besides its simplicity, the new proof leads to the following contributions: 1. For…
We introduce a general representation of large-population games in which each player s influence ON the others IS centralized AND limited, but may otherwise be arbitrary.This representation significantly generalizes the class known AS…
In this paper we propose a numerical method to obtain an approximation of Nash equilibria for multi-player non-cooperative games with a special structure. We consider the infinite horizon problem in a case which leads to a system of…
We consider a repeatedly played generalized Nash equilibrium game. This induces a multi-agent online learning problem with joint constraints. An important challenge in this setting is that the feasible set for each agent depends on the…
We consider finite $n$-person deterministic graphical games and study the existence of pure stationary Nash-equilibrium in such games. We assume that all infinite plays are equivalent and form a unique outcome, while each terminal position…
Two-player complete-information game trees are perhaps the simplest possible setting for studying general-sum games and the computational problem of finding equilibria. These games admit a simple bottom-up algorithm for finding subgame…
We present a computational formulation for the approximate version of several variational inequality problems, investigating their computational complexity and establishing PPAD-completeness. Examining applications in computational game…