Feedback Nash equilibria for scalar N-player linear quadratic dynamic games
Optimization and Control
2025-01-27 v1 Systems and Control
Systems and Control
Abstract
Considering infinite-horizon, discrete-time, linear quadratic, N-player dynamic games with scalar dynamics, a graphical representation of feedback Nash equilibrium solutions is provided. This representation is utilised to derive conditions for the number and properties of different feedback Nash equilibria a game may admit. The results are illustrated via a numerical example.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2411.19377,
title = {Feedback Nash equilibria for scalar N-player linear quadratic dynamic games},
author = {Benita Nortmann and Mario Sassano and Thulasi Mylvaganam},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.19377},
year = {2025}
}