Related papers: Set-Monotonicity Implies Kelly-Strategyproofness
A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a complete preferential vote. Completeness means that every voter expresses a comparison (a preference or a tie) about each pair…
We study a public decision problem in which a finite society selects a public-good level from a closed interval. Agents either have single-peaked preferences or are completely indifferent over the interval; the latter capture abstention or…
We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a…
In this paper, we take a statistical decision-theoretic viewpoint on social choice, putting a focus on the decision to be made on behalf of a system of agents. In our framework, we are given a statistical ranking model, a decision space,…
Selective rationalization has become a common mechanism to ensure that predictive models reveal how they use any available features. The selection may be soft or hard, and identifies a subset of input features relevant for prediction. The…
Consider the object allocation (one-sided matching) model of Shapley and Scarf (1974). When final allocations are observed but agents' preferences are unknown, when might the allocation be in the core? This is a one-sided analogue of the…
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the…
The control function approach allows the researcher to identify various causal effects of interest. While powerful, it requires a strong invertibility assumption in the selection process, which limits its applicability. This paper expands…
We study the Popular Matching problem in multiple models, where the preferences of the agents in the instance may change or may be unknown/uncertain. In particular, we study an Uncertainty model, where each agent has a possible set of…
Regulatory and contractual constraints on individual exposures are standard in insurance and reinsurance markets, but a poorly designed constraint can distort the economic incentives of risk-averse agents. In the unconstrained problem, the…
A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict…
In this paper, we consider the revealed preferences problem from a learning perspective. Every day, a price vector and a budget is drawn from an unknown distribution, and a rational agent buys his most preferred bundle according to some…
This paper provides a general framework to explore the possibility of agenda manipulation-proof and proper consensus-based preference aggregation rules, so powerfully called in doubt by a disputable if widely shared understanding of Arrow's…
We consider multi-item exchange markets in which agents want to receive one of their target bundles of resources. The model encompasses well-studied markets for kidney exchange, lung exchange, and multi-organ exchange. We identify a general…
In a one-commodity economy with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments, we study different ways in which reallocation rules can be strategically distorted by affecting the set of active agents. We introduce and characterize the…
Monotonicity is a key qualitative prediction of a wide array of economic models derived via robust comparative statics. It is therefore important to design effective and practical econometric methods for testing this prediction in empirical…
We propose a robust method of discrete choice analysis when agents' choice sets are unobserved. Our core model assumes nothing about agents' choice sets apart from their minimum size. Importantly, it leaves unrestricted the dependence,…
We study a class of preference domains that satisfies the familiar properties of minimal richness, diversity and no-restoration. We show that a specific preference restriction, hybridness, has been embedded in these domains so that the…
Ordered logics and type systems have been used in a variety of applications including computational linguistics, memory allocation, stream processing, logical frameworks, parametricity, and enforcing security protocols. In most…
Kelly criterion, that maximizes the expectation value of the logarithm of wealth for bookmaker bets, gives an advantage over different class of strategies. We use projective symmetries for a explanation of this fact. Kelly's approach allows…