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We propose a new class of game-theoretic models for network formation in which strategies are not directly related to edge choices, but instead correspond more generally to the exertion of social effort. The observed social network is thus…
In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation,…
In this paper the problem of optimal derivative design, profit maximization and risk minimization under adverse selection when multiple agencies compete for the business of a continuum of heterogenous agents is studied. The presence of ties…
A crucial aspect of research is understanding how real-world networks, such as transportation and information networks, are formed. A prominent model for such networks was introduced by \cite{fabrikant_network_2003} and extended by…
In a social network, individuals express their opinions on several interdependent topics, and therefore the evolution of their opinions on these topics is also mutually dependent. In this work, we propose a differential game model for the…
We study a cost sharing problem derived from bug bounty programs, where agents gain utility by the amount of time they get to enjoy the cost shared information. Once the information is provided to an agent, it cannot be retracted. The goal,…
We introduce a simple time-triggered protocol to achieve communication-efficient non-Bayesian learning over a network. Specifically, we consider a scenario where a group of agents interact over a graph with the aim of discerning the true…
We present a method aimed to compute the communicability (broadcast and receive) of nodes through causal paths in temporal networks. The method considers all possible combinations of chronologically ordered products of adjacency matrices of…
We study a simple model of information propagation in social networks, where two quantities are introduced: the spread factor, which measures the average maximal fraction of neighbors of a given node that interchange information among each…
Until now, distributed algorithms for rational agents have assumed a-priori knowledge of $n$, the size of the network. This assumption is challenged here by proving how much a-priori knowledge is necessary for equilibrium in different…
This paper considers the problem of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in aggregative games, where the payoff function of each player depends on an aggregate of all players' actions. We present a distributed continuous time algorithm such that…
A Bayesian agent experiences gain-loss utility each period over changes in belief about future consumption ("news utility"), with diminishing sensitivity over the magnitude of news. Diminishing sensitivity induces a preference over news…
We are concerned with finding Nash Equilibria in agent-based multi-cluster games, where agents are separated into distinct clusters. While the agents inside each cluster collaborate to achieve a common goal, the clusters are considered to…
We present the results of detailed numerical study of a model for the sharing and sorting of informations in a community consisting of a large number of agents. The information gathering takes place in a sequence of mutual bipartite…
We develop a novel framework for costly information acquisition in which a decision-maker learns about an unobserved state by choosing a signal distribution, with the cost of information determined by the distribution of noise in the…
Suppose that a set of $m$ tasks are to be shared as equally as possible amongst a set of $n$ resources. A game-theoretic mechanism to find a suitable allocation is to associate each task with a ``selfish agent'', and require each agent to…
Dynamical processes taking place on networks have received much attention in recent years, especially on various models of random graphs (including small world and scale free networks). They model a variety of phenomena, including the…
A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal…
We study a network formation game where agents receive benefits by forming connections to other agents but also incur both direct and indirect costs from the formed connections. Specifically, once the agents have purchased their…
We study the Nash equilibrium and the price of anarchy in the max-distance network creation game. Network creation game, first introduced and studied by Fabrikant et al., is a classic model for real-world networks from a game-theoretic…