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In this paper we introduce a capacity allocation game which models the problem of maximizing network utility from the perspective of distributed noncooperative agents. Motivated by the idea of self-managed networks, in the developed…
We investigate several variants of a network creation model: a group of agents builds up a network between them while trying to keep the costs of this network small. The cost function consists of two addends, namely (i) a constant amount…
The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…
We consider the problem of two wireless networks operating on the same (presumably unlicensed) frequency band. Pairs within a given network cooperate to schedule transmissions, but between networks there is competition for spectrum. To make…
Communication of signals among nodes in a complex network poses fundamental problems of efficiency and cost. Routing of messages along shortest paths requires global information about the topology, while spreading by diffusion, which…
This paper studies $n$-person simultaneous-move games with linear best response function, where individuals interact within a given network structure. This class of games have been used to model various settings, such as, public goods,…
Mean field game equilibria are predicated on the assumption of immediate pairwise interactions within a population of homogeneous agents with asymptotically vanishing influence as population size increases. However, in many real-world…
We study a neuro-inspired model that mimics a discussion (or information dissemination) process in a network of agents. During their interaction, agents redistribute activity and network weights, resulting in emergence of leader(s). The…
Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…
This paper studies information transmission from multiple senders who compete for the attention of a decision maker. Each sender is partially informed about the state of the world and decides how to reveal her information over time to…
This work investigates the diffusion of cooperative behavior over time in a decentralized cognitive radio network with selfish spectrum-sensing users. The users can individually choose whether or not to participate in cooperative spectrum…
We examine fundamental tradeoffs in iterative distributed zeroth and first order stochastic optimization in multi-agent networks in terms of \emph{communication cost} (number of per-node transmissions) and \emph{computational cost},…
Information diffusion on social networks has been described as a collective outcome of threshold behaviors in the framework of threshold models. However, since the existing models do not take into account individuals' optimization problem,…
One key in real-life Nash equilibrium applications is to calibrate players' cost functions. To leverage the approximation ability of neural networks, we proposed a general framework for optimizing and learning Nash equilibrium using neural…
We consider the problem of allocating a set of divisible goods to $N$ agents in an online manner, aiming to maximize the Nash social welfare, a widely studied objective which provides a balance between fairness and efficiency. The goods…
Coordination is a desirable feature in multi-agent systems, allowing the execution of tasks that would be impossible by individual agents. We study coordination by a team of strategic agents choosing to undertake one of the multiple tasks.…
We investigate both stationary and time-varying, nonmonotone generalized Nash equilibrium problems that exhibit symmetric interactions among the agents, which are known to be potential. As may happen in practical cases, however, we envision…
Peer-prediction is a mechanism which elicits privately-held, non-variable information from self-interested agents---formally, truth-telling is a strict Bayes Nash equilibrium of the mechanism. The original Peer-prediction mechanism suffers…
Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We…
We provide a game-theoretic analysis of consensus, assuming that processes are controlled by rational agents and may fail by crashing. We consider agents that \emph{care only about consensus}: that is, (a) an agent's utility depends only on…