Related papers: Weighted and Roughly Weighted Simple Games
A simple game $(N,v)$ is given by a set $N$ of $n$ players and a partition of $2^N$ into a set $\mathcal{L}$ of losing coalitions $L$ with value $v(L)=0$ that is closed under taking subsets and a set $\mathcal{W}$ of winning coalitions $W$…
A simple game $(N,v)$ is given by a set $N$ of $n$ players and a partition of~$2^N$ into a set~$\mathcal{L}$ of losing coalitions~$L$ with value $v(L)=0$ that is closed under taking subsets and a set $\mathcal{W}$ of winning coalitions $W$…
This study investigates simple games. A fundamental research question in this field is to determine necessary and sufficient conditions for a simple game to be a weighted majority game. Taylor and Zwicker (1992) showed that a simple game is…
Hierarchical simple games - both disjunctive and conjunctive - are natural generalizations of simple majority games. They take their origin in the theory of secret sharing. Another important generalization of simple majority games with…
Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game or a yes-no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of ``yea''…
We study the computational complexity of an important property of simple, regular and weighted games, which is decisiveness. We show that this concept can naturally be represented in the context of hypergraph theory, and that decisiveness…
Important decisions are likely made by groups of agents. Thus group decision making is very common in practice. Very transparent group aggregating rules are given by weighted voting, where each agent is assigned a weight. Here a proposal is…
Consider a situation with $n$ agents or players where some of the players form a coalition with a certain collective objective. Simple games are used to model systems that can decide whether coalitions are successful (winning) or not…
This paper has a twofold scope. The first one is to clarify and put in evidence the isomorphic character of two theories developed in quite different fields: on one side, threshold logic, on the other side, simple games. One of the main…
Gvozdeva, Hemaspaandra, and Slinko (2011) have introduced three hierarchies for simple games in order to measure the distance of a given simple game to the class of (roughly) weighted voting games. Their third class $\mathcal{C}_\alpha$…
This paper is a twofold contribution. First, it contributes to the problem of enumerating some classes of simple games and in particular provides the number of weighted games with minimum and the number of weighted games for the dual class…
Coalitional voting games appear in different forms in multi-agent systems, social choice and threshold logic. In this paper, the complexity of comparison of influence between players in coalitional voting games is characterized. The…
We use simplicial complexes to model simple games as well as weighted voting games where certain coalitions are considered impossible. Topological characterizations of various ideas from simple games are provided, as are the expressions for…
We consider weighted sums of independent random variables regulated by an increment sequence. We provide operative conditions that ensure strong law of large numbers for such sums to hold in both the centered and non-centered case. The…
An algorithm is proposed to verify whether a finite game is a weighted potential game (WPG) without pre-knowledge on its weights. Then the algorithm is also applied to find the closest WPG for a given finite game. The concept and criterion…
We initiate the study of simple games from the point of view of combinatorial topology. The starting premise is that the losing coalitions of a simple game can be identified with a simplicial complex. Various topological constructions and…
A proposal in a weighted voting game is accepted if the sum of the (non-negative) weights of the "yea" voters is at least as large as a given quota. Several authors have considered representations of weighted voting games with minimum sum,…
The $k$-majority game is played with $n$ numbered balls, each coloured with one of two colours. It is given that there are at least $k$ balls of the majority colour, where $k$ is a fixed integer greater than $n/2$. On each turn the player…
We provide a unifying, black-box tool for establishing existence of approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games and, at the same time, bounding their Price of Stability. Our framework can handle resources with general…
We generalize the notion of convexity and average-convexity to the notion of weighted average-convexity. We show several results on the relation between weighted average-convexity and cooperative games. First, we prove that if a game is…