Related papers: Structure-preserving desynchronization of minority…
Models in evolutionary game theory traditionally assume symmetric interactions in homogeneous environments. Here, we consider populations evolving in a heterogeneous environment, which consists of patches of different qualities that are…
Minority games where groups of agents remember, react or incorporate information with different timescales are investigated. We study how their respective gains depend on their timescales for standard models and games with no public…
In evolutionary game theory, an important measure of a mutant trait (strategy) is its ability to invade and take over an otherwise-monomorphic population. Typically, one quantifies the success of a mutant strategy via the probability that a…
A general model for zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information is considered. In this model, each player's information at each time can be divided into a common information part and a private information part. Under certain…
We show that a simple evolutionary scheme, when applied to the minority game (MG), changes the phase structure of the game. In this scheme each agent evolves individually whenever his wealth reaches the specified bankruptcy level, in…
Learning in zero-sum games studies a situation where multiple agents competitively learn their strategy. In such multi-agent learning, we often see that the strategies cycle around their optimum, i.e., Nash equilibrium. When a game…
A sufficiently connected topology linking the constituent units of a complex system is usually seen as a prerequisite for the emergence of collective phenomena such as synchronization. We present a random network of heterogeneous phase…
The emergence of complex structures in the systems governed by a simple set of rules is among the most fascinating aspects of Nature. The particularly powerful and versatile model suitable for investigating this phenomenon is provided by…
We present a theory which describes a recently introduced model of an evolving, adaptive system in which agents compete to be in the minority. The agents themselves are able to evolve their strategies over time in an attempt to improve…
The Minority Game is a simple yet highly non-trivial agent-based model for a complex adaptive system. Despite its importance, a quantitative explanation of the game's fluctuations which applies over the entire parameter range of interest…
Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…
In the study of the evolution of cooperation, resource limitations are usually assumed just to provide a finite population size. Recently, however, it has been pointed out that resource limitation may also generate dynamical payoffs able to…
Resource allocation systems provide the fundamental support for the normal functioning and well being of the modern society, and can be modeled as minority games. A ubiquitous dynamical phenomenon is the emergence of herding, where a vast…
Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…
In a recent article [1] we surveyed advances related to adaptation, learning, and optimization over synchronous networks. Various distributed strategies were discussed that enable a collection of networked agents to interact locally in…
In many stochastic games stemming from financial models, the environment evolves with latent factors and there may be common noise across agents' states. Two classic examples are: (i) multi-agent trading on electronic exchanges, and (ii)…
We present detailed numerical results for a modified form of the so-called Minority Game, which provides a simplified model of a competitive market. Each agent has a limited set of strategies, and competes to be in a minority. An…
We study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There is a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with…
We study the problem of achieving decentralized coordination by a group of strategic decision makers choosing to engage or not in a task in a stochastic setting. First, we define a class of symmetric utility games that encompass a broad…
Understanding and predicting the behavior of large-scale multi-agents in games remains a fundamental challenge in multi-agent systems. This paper examines the role of heterogeneity in equilibrium formation by analyzing how smooth…