Related papers: Structure-preserving desynchronization of minority…
The classical Kuramoto model is studied in the setting of an infinite horizon mean field game. The system is shown to exhibit both synchronization and phase transition. Incoherence below a critical value of the interaction parameter is…
Transients are fundamental to ecological systems with significant implications to management, conservation, and biological control. We uncover a type of transient synchronization behavior in spatial ecological networks whose local dynamics…
Establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for partially observed stochastic dynamic games is known to be quite challenging, with the difficulties stemming from the noisy nature of the measurements available to individual players…
We provide a theoretical description of the Minority Game in terms of crowd effects. The size of the fluctuations arising in the game is controlled by the interplay between crowds of like-minded agents and their anti-correlated partners…
We consider N-player and mean field games in continuous time over a finite horizon, where the position of each agent belongs to {-1,1}. If there is uniqueness of mean field game solutions, e.g. under monotonicity assumptions, then the…
Simultaneous reproduction of all financial stylized facts is so difficult that most existing stochastic process-based and agent-based models are unable to achieve the goal. In this study, by extending the decision-making structure of…
The minority game (MG) model introduced recently provides promising insights into the understanding of the evolution of prices, indices and rates in the financial markets. In this paper we perform a time series analysis of the model…
We study the roles of social and individual learning on outcomes of the Minority Game model of a financial market. Social learning occurs via agents adopting the strategies of their neighbours within a social network, while individual…
A stochastic model for behavioral changes by imitative pair interactions of individuals is developed. `Microscopic' assumptions on the specific form of the imitative processes lead to a stochastic version of the game dynamical equations.…
We investigate a game-theoretic model of a social system where both the rules of the game and the interaction structure are shaped by the behavior of the agents. We call this type of model, with several types of feedback couplings from the…
Game dynamics theory, as a field of science, the consistency of theory and experiment is essential. In the past 10 years, important progress has been made in the merging of the theory and experiment in this field, in which dynamics cycle is…
We analyse the typical structure of games in terms of the connectivity properties of their best-response graphs. Our central result shows that, among games that are `generic' (without indifferences) and that have a pure Nash equilibrium,…
We propose a payoff function extending Minority Games (MG) that captures the competition between agents to make money. In constrast with previous MG, the best strategies are not always targeting the minority but are shifting…
A key challenge in multi-robot and multi-agent systems is generating solutions that are robust to other self-interested or even adversarial parties who actively try to prevent the agents from achieving their goals. The practicality of…
We show analytically how the fluctuations (i.e. standard deviation) in the Minority Game (MG) can decrease below the random coin-toss limit if the agents use more general, stochastic strategies. This suppression of the standard deviation…
In this paper we consider a network of boolean agents that compete for a limited resource. The agents play the so called Generalized Minority Game where the capacity level is allowed to vary externally. We study the properties of such a…
We discuss in detail the derivation of stochastic differential equations for the continuum time limit of the Minority Game. We show that all properties of the Minority Game can be understood by a careful theoretical analysis of such…
Evolutionary anti-coordination games on networks capture real-world strategic situations such as traffic routing and market competition. In such games, agents maximize their utility by choosing actions that differ from their neighbors'…
Strategic interactions between a group of individuals or organisations can be modelled as games played on networks, where a player's payoff depends not only on their actions but also on those of their neighbours. Inferring the network…
A generic property of biological, social and economical networks is their ability to evolve in time, creating and suppressing interactions. We approach this issue within the framework of an adaptive network of agents playing a Prisoner's…