Related papers: On the Complexity of Core, Kernel, and Bargaining …
We deal with coalitional games possessing strictly positive values. Individually rational allocations of such a game has clear fractional interpretations. Many concepts, including the long-existing core and other stability notions more…
This paper investigates the potential benefits of cooperation in scenarios where finitely many agents compete for shared resources, leading to congestion and thereby reduced rewards. By appropriate coordination the members of the…
We study the problem of partitioning a set of agents into coalitions based on the agents' additively separable preferences, which can also be viewed as a hedonic game. We apply three successively weaker solution concepts, namely…
Reward allocation, also known as the credit assignment problem, has been an important topic in economics, engineering, and machine learning. An important concept in reward allocation is the core, which is the set of stable allocations where…
A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the \emph{core}--the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games…
Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game or a yes-no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of ``yea''…
Coalition Logic is an important logic in logical studies of strategic reasoning, whose models are concurrent game models. In this paper, first, we systematically discuss three assumptions of concurrent game models and argue that they are…
Coalitional games serve the purpose of modeling payoff distribution problems in scenarios where agents can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. In the classical Transferable Utility…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
Game theoretical techniques have recently become prevalent in many engineering applications, notably in communications. With the emergence of cooperation as a new communication paradigm, and the need for self-organizing, decentralized, and…
We study the complexity of several combinatorial problems in the model of binary networked public goods games. In this game, players are represented by vertices in a network, and the action of each player can be either investing or not…
Cores of cooperative games are ubiquitous in information theory, and arise most frequently in the characterization of fundamental limits in various scenarios involving multiple users. Examples include classical settings in network…
Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity…
In many situations when people are assigned to coalitions, the utility of each person depends on the friends in her coalition. Additionally, in many situations, the size of each coalition should be bounded. This paper studies such coalition…
We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…
The theory of computational complexity focuses on functions and, hence, studies programs whose interactive behavior is reduced to a simple question/answer pattern. We propose a broader theory whose ultimate goal is expressing and analyzing…
We present a general framework to model strategic aspects and stable and fair resource allocations in networks via variants and generalizations of path coalitional games. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it…
Hedonic games provide a general model of coalition formation, in which a set of agents is partitioned into coalitions, with each agent having preferences over which other players are in her coalition. We prove that with additively separable…
We extend concurrent game structures (CGSs) with a simple notion of preference over computations and define a minimal notion of rationality for agents based on the concept of dominance. We use this notion to interpret a CL and an ATL…
The information decomposition problem requires an additive decomposition of the mutual information between the input and target variables into nonnegative terms. The recently introduced solution to this problem, Information Attribution,…